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Seeking the Better Interests of Children
I.

INTRODUCTION

	Intercountry adoption is in the midst of an identity crisis. Its character, its
mission, and its morality are subjects of anguished and even angry debate. Most
participants in the debate assert that they are seeking the “best” interests of children,
but the paths they describe seem to lead anywhere but to common ground. Statistics
showing the annual number of intercountry adoptions have marched consistently
downward since 2004, as if to signal spreading disillusionment.1
This is not the end for intercountry adoption, it is a transition. Intercountry
adoption has never been free from controversy, except perhaps in a distant past when
it was the eccentric and rarely seen cousin of “domestic” adoption. The intensity of
today’s debate is a function of the spreading practice and awareness of intercountry
adoption, and of its extension to regions that are only beginning to develop the
cultural, legal, and physical infrastructure for adoption. Intercountry adoption has
evolved from an off-beat and episodic “American” phenomenon into a highly visible
global phenomenon, 2 a major aspect of modern family law, and therefore an attractive
target for a wider circle of academics, journalists, and politicians with a diversity of
agendas. The debate has also been fueled by real malfeasance and scandal of the sort
that periodically visits “domestic” adoption. 3 But adoption—whether domestic or
intercountry—is not inherently flawed. For all the risks it might pose in any individual
case, it remains the best way to match many thousands of children in need with
prospective parents wanting and willing to accept the joys and burdens of parenthood.
The answers to adoption’s current malaise are the same that they have always been:
vigilance, continued search for practical and workable safeguards against unethical
conduct, and realism about the purposes, benefits, and risks of adoption.

1.

See Scott Baldauf et al., International Adoption: A Big Fix Brings Dramatic Decline, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Mar. 14, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2010/0314/Internationaladoption-A-big-fix-brings-dramatic-decline. According to statistics compiled by the Office of
Children’s Issues of the U.S. State Department, the annual number of intercountry adoptions by U.S.
residents reached a peak in 2004 at just under 23,000. By 2009 the number had declined dramatically
by well over 40% to 12,753. Total Adoptions to the United States, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of
Children’s Issues, http://adoption.state.gov/news/total_chart.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). The
United States is the nation of origin in over 40% of intercountry adoptions. See International Adoption
Statistics, Australian Intercountry Adoption Network, http://www.aican.org/statistics.
php?region=0&type=receiving (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Int’l Adoption Statistics].

2.

For an early history of intercountry adoption, see Richard Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children,
23 Tulsa L.J. 317 (1988). Today, the United States is only one of many “receiving” nations in intercountry
adoption. In most intercountry adoptions, the receiving nation is a nation other than the United States.
Calculated on a per capita basis, the United States is now twelfth on a list of major receiving nations.
Int’l Adoption Statistics, supra note 1.

3.

One recent and widely publicized scandal involved a missionary group’s misguided effort to remove a
number of non-orphan children from Haiti, possibly for the purpose of adoption. Marc Lacey, Haiti
Charges Americans with Child Abduction, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/
world/americas/05orphans.html. A second involved a U.S. adoptive parent’s rejection and return of her
adopted son to Russia. Clifford Levy, Russia Calls for Halt on American Adoptions, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/world/europe/10russia.html.
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The purpose of this article is to evaluate the arguments against intercountry
adoption, weigh proposals for regulatory reform, and offer a plan for restating
international law with respect to adoption. Part II summarizes the debate by
presenting the arguments of various factions, and it includes an evaluation of the
prospect, advisability, and limits of regulatory reforms proposed by some factions.
Part III addresses the debate over a particular fact: Are there a significant number
of “orphans” who might benefit from adoption? It might seem the answer to this
question should be easy to discover and verify, but the answer involves not just hard
facts but also the interpretation of facts. Proponents for adoption see many millions
of children in need of adoption; skeptics dismiss the proponents’ statistics as a
“myth.”4 The certainly true and important answer is that the number of children who
would almost certainly benefit from adoption far exceeds the number of prospective
adoptive parents.
Finally, Part IV proposes a restatement of international law regarding adoption.
There are three parts to this restatement. First, for purposes of international law, we
should avoid the “best interests of the child” standard. The best interests standard is
mainly an adjudicatory standard with implicit qualifications. Its use as a standard for
promoting and evaluating child welfare policies is misleading and unhelpful. Future
international law should substitute a more meaningful standard: nations should seek
policies that achieve the “better interests” of children. Second, international law
should decisively endorse adoption as an essential feature of any nation’s child welfare
policies. The international community should endorse adoption regardless of its view
of intercountry adoption. Finally, international law should reject the strict view of
“subsidiarity,” which requires that a “sending” nation must exhaust all possibilities of
local placement before releasing a child for adoption by parents from a “receiving”
nation.5 Strict subsidiarity, crudely applied, leads unnecessarily to institutionalization
or abusive forms of foster placement. It is time for international law to move forward
with a more sophisticated approach to placement options.

4.

See, e.g., Fiona Bowie, Adoption and the Circulation of Children: A Comparative Perspective, in CrossCultural Approaches to Adoption 3, 14 (Fiona Bowie ed., 2004); Claudia Fonseca, The Circulation
of Children in a Brazilian Working-Class Neighborhood, in Cross-Cultural Approaches to Adoption,
supra, at 165.

5.

Some critics of intercountry adoption have described this as a rule that makes intercountry adoption the
“last resort.” See, e.g., Benyam Mezmur, Intercountry Adoption as a Measure of Last Resort in Africa:
Advancing the Rights of a Child Rather Than a Right to a Child, 10 Int’l J. Hum. Rts. 83, 83–84 (2009)
(describing nationalist views against intercountry adoption).
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II. THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION DEBATE

A. Overview

	Adoption has been a subject of controversy since the enactment of the earliest
adoption laws6 and long before the first intercountry adoptions.7 While the context
of adoption controversies has changed over time, the essential issues have not.
Supporters and critics of adoption have argued whether adoption serves the “best
interests” of children, whether it results in an unsavory “baby market,” whether it is
sufficiently protective of birth parents or adoptive parents, and whether the rules of
adoption can be reformed to achieve the legitimate goals of adoption and to prevent
unethical conduct. Within the United States, these issues have propelled the evolution
of adoption law over a period of more than 160 years. The concept, law, and process
of adoption continue to be works in progress.8
	Like the debate over domestic adoption, the debate over intercountry adoption
has deep roots and shifting contexts over time. Much of today’s debate is connected
to two important instruments of international law: the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child9 (CRC) and the Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption10 (the “Hague
Convention” or the “Convention”). These two documents disagree over the proper
role of intercountry adoption in addressing the needs of children and their families.
The CRC condones but does not demand adoptive placement for a child who is
deprived of his or her “family environment.”11 Adoption is merely one alternative for
such a child. Other alternatives include foster care or a “suitable institution.”12
6.

A Massachusetts law dated 1851, the Adoption of Children Act, 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324, is widely
regarded as the first U.S. law on formal adoption. See Timeline of Adoption History, Adoption History
Project, Univ. of Oregon, http://www.uoregon.edu/~adoption/timeline.html (last updated July 11,
2007) [hereinafter Timeline of Adoption History]. The first adoptions laws were at least partly in response
to controversies that preceded formal adoption: the potential abuses of informal placement that might
be mainly for labor, the use of indentured servitude as a form of placement for children in need of
homes, and the lack of secure legal bonds between children and their long-term de facto caregivers. See
Rebecca Trammell, Orphan Train Myths and Legal Reality, 5 Modern Am. 3, 6–7 (2009); Legate v.
Legate, 28 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1894) (involving resolution of competing claims between de facto parents and
legal father). One of the earliest controversies involved the so-called “orphan trains” that first launched
in 1854 and continued until 1929. See Trammell, supra.

7.

See Carlson, supra note 2, at 321–34.

8.

For example, the debate over the extent to which adoptive children should be completely severed from
their birth families lingers as an issue. One semi-recent change in the law of one U.S. state authorizes a
court to grant birth grandparent “access” to or “reasonable possession” of an adoptive child, despite the
termination of the birth parents’ parental rights. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.017(d) (West 2005).

9.

Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm.

10.

Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, concluded
May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force May 1, 1995) [hereinafter Hague Convention],
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69.

11.

CRC, supra note 9, art. 20.

12.

Id.
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Properly interpreted, the CRC does appear to favor adoption, or at least foster care
over institutionalization.13 However, the CRC’s mild approval of adoption is mainly
for adoption within a child’s nation of origin. The CRC endorses intercountry
adoption only if the child cannot be placed in “any suitable manner” in the child’s
nation of origin.14 According to some interpretations, “suitable” placement within the
nation of origin might include an institution or an undefined form of foster care.15
The CRC’s preference for any “suitable” local placement over intercountry adoption
is sometimes referred to as the “principle of subsidiarity.”16 The strict view of
subsidiarity is that intercountry adoption is the last resort for a child for whom there
is no “suitable” local placement.17
The other major international adoption law, the Hague Convention, adopts a
modified version of subsidiarity that moves the rank of intercountry adoption up one
notch, at least for a limited number of nations that have signed the Convention. The
Preamble states that “intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of
origin.”18 In other words, family placement (adoptive or foster; local or intercountry)
is favored over institutionalization in most cases, but “suitable” local family placement
(foster or adoptive) trumps intercountry adoption. The Hague Convention’s
endorsement of adoption is not as powerful as one might expect given the Convention’s
principle purpose of facilitating intercountry adoption by a set of international rules
and procedures.19 Naturally, a blanket endorsement of adoption for all children in all
situations of need would be inappropriate. Still, the Hague Convention falls short of
speaking clearly to the issues of what constitutes suitable local family placement or
when efforts at local adoption should be abandoned in favor of intercountry
adoption.20
These two documents—the CRC and the Hague Convention—frame the debate:
Does international law fail children by improperly encouraging, discouraging, or
ranking intercountry adoption, and is the law sufficiently protective of children and
other parties involved in adoption? The major participants in the debate can be
13.

Id.

14.

Id. art. 21(b).

15.

See, e.g., Laura McKinney, International Adoption and the Hague Convention: Does Implementation of the
Convention Protect the Best Interests of Children?, 6 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 361, 379 (2007).

16.

See, e.g., Lisa M. Katz, Comment, A Modest Proposal? The Convention on Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 9 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 283, 304 (1995) (citation
omitted).

17.

Id. at 303–04.

18.

Hague Convention, supra note 10, at pmbl. (emphasis added).

19.

See Richard Carlson, The Emerging Law of Intercountry Adoption: An Analysis of the Hague Conference on
Intercountry Adoption, 30 Tulsa L.J. 243, 255–65 (1994).

20. “Suitable local family placement” might refer to a wide range of delayed adoption, extended family or

non-family foster placement, or household service arrangements that are not in a child’s best interests.
See infra Parts II.C.7–D.1., IV.B.
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divided roughly into three groups: cynical critics of intercountry adoption, moderate
critics of intercountry adoption, and vigorous advocates for intercountry adoption.
For cynical critics, any endorsement of intercountry adoption is suspect. Cynical
critics are a diverse group and are not necessarily all on the same page when it comes
to a discussion about whether adoption is in “a child’s best interests.” Many cynical
critics admit that they are motivated by ideologies, causes, or service to interest
groups that may not be aligned with the best interests of “adoptable” children. This
is not to say that all of the cynical critics find the interests of children to be irrelevant.
Some reject or discount evidence that institutionalization is harmful to children.
Others elevate the interests of other parties, such as those of the child’s community of
origin or other children who will not be adopted under any circumstances. In this
regard, it is important to note that supporters and critics of intercountry adoption
might have different constituencies in mind when they speak of “children’s interests”
or social justice.
Moderate critics, on the other hand, generally support a qualified endorsement
of intercountry adoption such as that expressed in the CRC’s or the Hague
Convention’s version of subsidiarity. They are not ideologically predisposed against
adoption, and they agree that many children might be well served by intercountry
adoption. However, moderate critics are especially concerned about corruption and
regulatory vacuums or breakdowns that taint the process. In contrast with the more
cynical critics, moderate critics are more likely to place adoptable children’s interests
at the forefront of their analysis, but this analysis is counterbalanced by the interests
of birth families, local communities, and the non-adoptable children left behind by
the adoption process.
Finally, vigorous advocates for intercountry adoption give the greatest weight to
the interests of adoptable children. They are more optimistic about the benefits of
intercountry adoption for children who are adopted, and more emphatic about the
need to promote adoption. Like moderate critics, advocates for intercountry adoption
recognize the risks of errors, corruption, and potential unfairness to birth families,
but their analysis tips the scales somewhat more in favor of adoptable children and
somewhat less in favor of birth families. Advocates also frequently argue that the
subsidiarity principle is destructive to children’s interests in actual practice because it
delays or completely prevents family placement for thousands of children in need,
diverting many into unhealthy institutions or questionable “foster” arrangements.
	Of course, the participants in this debate are not truly divisible into three simple
and distinct groups. The opinions of some are quite complex and may overlap from
one group to the next. Still, for the purpose of summarizing the arguments of
different factions, it is convenient to organize critics and advocates into different
categories, starting with the most vigorous supporters of intercountry adoption, then
moving to the extreme opposite position of cynical critics such as Baroness Emma
Nicholson, and ending with the moderate critics who fall somewhere in the middle.
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B. Vigorous Supporters of Intercountry Adoption

Vigorous proponents of intercountry adoption are represented by Professors
Elizabeth Bartholet 21 and Sarah Dillon, 22 who argue that the interests of children
worldwide would best be served by a stronger endorsement of intercountry adoption.
Professor Dillon proposes a child’s human right to adoption—including intercountry
adoption—for children who might otherwise be without family placement.23 She also
calls for new empirical research into the conditions of children around the world to
determine the true scale of the need for adoptive placements.24 Professor Bartholet
seeks a reordering of placement priorities that would place intercountry adoption
clearly ahead of institutionalization and foster care, and possibly on par with domestic
adoptive placement.25
The notion that the opportunity for intercountry adoption should gain a priority
clearly ahead of institutionalization and foster care may be at odds with the CRC’s
subsidiarity principle, depending on one’s interpretation. It is certainly at odds with
the view that subsidiarity makes intercountry adoption “the last resort.” However,
Professor Bartholet worries that a broad or vague preference for local placement will
encourage local and national public officials to engage in practices that deny quick
intercountry placement while authorities search for “appropriate” foster care or for
local adoptive parents who, in many nations, remain in short supply. 26 Delayed
placement is a serious harm because it interferes with a child’s bonding with a
parental caregiver at a critical period in the child’s mental and emotional development.

21.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Child’s Story, 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 333 (2007)
[hereinafter Bartholet, The Child’s Story]; Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the
Human Rights Issues, 13 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 151 (2007) [hereinafter Bartholet, Thoughts on the
Human Rights Issues].

22.

See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles:
Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. Int’l L.J. 179 (2003); see also Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption
Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and Parameters, 4 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 323 (2005).

23.

Dillon, supra note 22, at 200, 253; see also Wardle, supra note 22, at 323, 336.

24.

Dillon, supra note 22, at 182–85.

25.

Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 192–93.

26. Id. Professor Bartholet proposes a concurrent planning model, in which

adoption professionals work simultaneously to reunite children in foster care with their
birth parents, while they work to prepare for adoption. At the point that a decision is
reached not to reunite, the child can immediately move forward to adoption. Adapted
to international adoption, this model would mean that adoption officials in the sending
country would plan simultaneously for the international adoption, while they checked
to see if any domestic placement would be possible, rather than planning the
international adoption only after exhausting the possibility of domestic adoption.

Id. at 194. She also proposes time limits for holding children in institutions or foster care, following the
model of current U.S. law. Id. at 194–95.
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The lack of early bonding can have long-term and seriously detrimental effects on
the child’s emotional and physical well-being.27
This very pronounced focus on avoidance of harm to the child—and on the
potential gains of adoption—means more than merely overturning the subsidiarity
principle. It also means a much more frequent elevation of a child’s interests over the
interests of parents, family, community, and the state in determining whether to
move forward with new adoptive placement or to await some substantial improvement
in the ability or willingness of the birth parents, extended family, or community to
provide a healthy family environment for a child.28
Pro-adoption advocates such as Professors Bartholet and Dillon can also seem
like moderate critics. They concede that adoption can go wrong and that adoption
agencies and officials have sometimes engaged in serious wrongdoing in child
placement. However, these advocates worry less about impropriety—a problem they
believe is frequently overstated 29—and more about the harm to children who linger
in institutions because of delayed family placement.30 For example, in weighing the
harm of in indeterminate number of unethical or illegal inducements for the
relinquishment of children, Professor Bartholet considers the empirical evidence that
the resulting family placements are not directly harmful to children, who might have
been placed for adoption regardless of inducement, or who might gain a better life
situation regardless of the inducement.31 Professor Bartholet employs a “surrogacy”
analogy in analyzing the problem of illicit payments:
There are no doubt some number of birth parents in sending countries who
are getting payments that indeed do function to persuade them to surrender
children for adoption that otherwise they might have kept, and even to get
pregnant in order to surrender the children born. The latter practice we call
surrogacy and in the U.S. it is legal today in almost all states, with an
enormous surrogacy industry primed to expand the practice as we move
forward to the future. I myself would prohibit commercial surrogacy both
here and abroad, and I also believe we should maintain the existing prohibition
on payments to already-pregnant women designed to induce surrender of the
child. However I think we need to acknowledge that such payments are not
the ultimate evil that they are often assumed to be. They may on balance be
wrong, but they need to be weighed against other evils as regulators decide
how to shape policy on international adoption. 32

27.

Id. at 179–80 & nn.73–76, 191–92; Dillon, supra note 22, at 193 & n.46, 206 & n.96, 238 & n.201.

28. See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 337–38; Dillon, supra note 22, at 221–26.
29. See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 374–75; Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues,

supra note 21, at 156–57.

30. See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 338, 342–47; Elisabeth M. Ward, Utilizing Intercountry

Adoption to Combat Human Rights Abuses of Children, 17 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 729, 743–45 (2009).

31.

See Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 186–88.

32.

Id. at 188.
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	In Professor Bartholet’s view, overzealous and miscalculated regulatory responses
to reports of corruption are to be feared more than the corruption because regulatory
reaction invariably results in a shutdown of intercountry adoption and denial of
family placement to thousands of children. 33 Professor Bartholet’s distrust of
governmental management of adoption also leads her to favor a relatively open field
for private intercountry adoption agencies and professionals.34
C. Cynical Opponents of Intercountry Adoption
		

1. The Extreme Position: An Absolute Ban Against Intercountry Adoption

Baroness Nicholson, a former European Parliament Rapporteur for Romania, is
probably the most prominent advocate against intercountry adoption, mainly because
of her role in leading a drive in the European Parliament to require Romania’s
complete prohibition against intercountry adoption of children as a condition of its
accession to the European Union.35 Her nearly absolute opposition to intercountry
adoption is based on a belief that intercountry adoption “has been hijacked by the
child traffickers”36 and that adoptive parents are “unwittingly supporting crime.”37 In
opposing intercountry adoption of children in Romania, Baroness Nicholson asserted
that “[c]hildren exported abroad—often against their will—are often subjected to
paedophilia, child prostitution or domestic servitude.” 38 Her sensational charges
attracted considerable attention within Romania, the European community, and the
global community. Baroness Nicholson and her supporters succeeded in obtaining a
complete ban on intercountry adoption in Romania.39
33.

See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 372–74; Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues,
supra note 21, at 188–91 (citing examples from Latin America).

34. See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 341–44, 368–70; Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human

Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 176–77, 188–90.

35.

See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 341; Dillon, supra note 22, at 250–51 (noting that
Romania’s ban on intercountry adoptions remains in effect to this day); Jennifer Ratcliff, International
Adoption: Improving on the 1993 Hague Convention, 23 NYSBA Int’l L. Practicum, Spring 2010, at
55; Charles Tannock, European Parliamentarians Break the Nicholson Monopoly on Intercountry Adoption,
Bucharest Daily News (Mar. 8, 2006), http://www.charlestannock.com/pressarticle.asp?ID=1190
(noting that the European Parliament has changed its position and now favors intercountry adoption).

36. Marie Hourihane, Does Going West Really Mean a Better Life?, The Tribune (Ireland), Jan. 5, 2003,

http://www.tribune.ie/article/2003/jan/05/does-going-west-really-mean-a-better-life/?q=/.

37.

Id. (noting that one special exception to Baroness Nicholson’s opposition to intercountry adoption is
Kenya, the one nation which she believes does have children in need of family placement by intercountry
adoption).

38. Emma Nicholson, Red Light on Human Traffic, Guardian.co.uk, July 1, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/

society/2004/jul/01/adoptionandfostering.europeanunion (noting that most of Baroness Nicholson’s
sweeping public statements regarding intercountry adoption of Romanian children were without reference
to any particular cases or facts, and are now widely rejected). See also Tannock, supra note 35.

39.

See Carrie Rankin, Romania’s New Child Protection Legislation: Change in Intercountry Adoption Law
Results in Human Rights Violation, 34 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 259, 263 (2006) (noting that the
ban remains in effect today); Ratcliff, supra note 35, at 57.
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	In retrospect, it is clear that the data on which Baroness Nicholson relied did not
support, and in some very important ways contradicted, her most shocking
accusations. For example, Baroness Nicholson presented no evidence that Romanian
children were ever sent abroad for adoption “against their will.” The single case she
cited as an example was, in fact, very much to the contrary.40 Nor does it appear that
adoptive children were “often subjected to paedophilia, child prostitution or domestic
servitude.” In a later defense of her statements, Baroness Nicholson offered three
reports by other authors and organizations to support her allegations.41 A close and
complete examination of those reports, however, reveals nothing to support Baroness
Nicholson’s charge that adoptive children were being placed in servitude or used for
criminal enterprises.42 One report stated, “We found nothing that would indicate
40. In stating that children were being adopted and removed from the country against their will, Baroness

Nicholson cited one particular case involving two young Romanian children, “Florentina” and “Marina,”
a case that reached the European Court of Human Rights. See Nicholson, supra note 38. The facts in
those two adoption cases are summarized in two of the Court’s opinions.

		According to the court, Italian couples obtained adoption decrees for Florentina and Marina in
September 2000. Pini v. Romania, 2005-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 313, 317 (2004). However, over the next
three years, the children’s home (referenced herein as the “CEPSB”) where Florentina and Marina
resided in Romania successfully resisted transferring custody to the adoptive parents, sometimes hiding
the children from police, and thereby preventing any contact between the children and adoptive parents
over an extended period of time. Id. at 321. Despite over three years of litigation between the adoptive
parents and CEPSB, there does not appear to have been any evidence or allegation that the childrens’
birth families were resisting the adoption or that the adoption decrees were procured by fraud or bribery.
Id.

	Nevertheless, after CEPSB’s successful separation of the children from the adoptive parents, further
proceedings determined that the children, one of whom was then ten years old, did not wish to leave
CEPSB or be adopted by persons they “did not know.” Id. at 326. For this reason, and not because of any
irregularity in the original adoptions, the European Court of Human Rights determined that the
adoptions should be revoked. Id. at 346. Thus, the children were not removed from Romania against
their will. The court noted further: “[T]he sole cause of the failure to execute the applicants’ adoption
orders has been action taken by the CEPSB staff and its founder members, who have consistently opposed
the children’s departure for Italy by making various applications to prevent enforcement and preventing
the court bailiffs from carrying out their tasks effectively.” Id. at 348. Although the court held that the
adoptions should be revoked, it also found that Romania had violated the adoptive parents’ rights by
disrupting the adoptions, and it awarded damages in favor of the adoptive parents. Id. at 351–53.

41.

Baroness Emma Nicholson, A Battle Fought, and Won, Transitions Online (Mar. 29, 2006), http://
www.tol.org/client/article/16148-a-battle-fought-and-won.html.

42.

The first report, written by Jonathan Dickens, addressed the question of whether intercountry adoption
was providing or diverting resources for other family services, such as local foster placement. Jonathan
Dickens, The Paradox of Inter-Country Adoption: Analysing Romania’s Experience as a Sending Country, 11
Int’l J. Soc. Welfare 76 (2002).

The second report, written by Michael Ambrose and Anna Marie Coburn, and prepared for the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is a broader analysis of the adoption system in
Romania. Michael W. Ambrose & Anna Mary Coburn, Report on Intercountry Adoption in
Romania (2001), available at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACW989.pdf. Again, the chief problem
identified by this report is that intercountry adoption diverts resources away from local placement
efforts. Id. at 2, 13.

		
The third report, entitled Re-Organising the International Adoption and Child Protection System, is
no more than what its title suggests—a discussion of the need to reorganize the adoption system in
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that intercountry adoptions of Romanian children do not usually represent good
placements for the children.”43 Two of the reports alluded to the serious but separate
problems of whether some adoption agencies or intermediaries had gained
relinquishments for adoption by the payment of money to birth families or other
persons, and whether agencies had properly verified the availability of some children
for adoption.44 As those two reports indicate, these problems were mainly the result
of lax regulation, which was later cured at least in part by legislative reforms, and
those reforms were in place before Baroness Nicholson’s allegations of criminality.45
One of the two reports did not even investigate whether unethical practices continued
to be a serious problem.46 The other concluded, “We did not receive any information
about any individual child being exchanged for money or other value.”47
Baroness Nicholson is not an academic; she is a politician, and one might question
whether an analysis of her rhetoric deserves close inspection in a mainly academic
debate. The obvious answer is that the debate is one that has influenced and will
continue to influence real policy decisions, as it did in the case of Romania. Moreover,
Baroness Nicholson’s use and misuse of rhetoric to affect the development of family
law offers important lessons for the academic debate.
First, the terms that we use—“trafficking,” “baby-selling,” “laundering,” and
“exploitation”—are heard in an audience larger than academia. While the use of such
terms may be accurate in the right context, the larger audience may not understand
the limits of our use of these words. A casual description of adoption as the
“trafficking”48 or “laundering”49 or “commodification”50 of children, without careful
Romania. See Indep. Grp. for Int’l Adoption Analysis, Re-organising the International
Adoption and Child Protection System (2002), available at http://www.afaener.org/Rapport_
FINAL_ang.doc. It contains no investigation or discussion of improper financial inducements for
adoption or other criminality. See id.
43.

Ambrose & Coburn, supra note 42, at 2. See also Dickens, supra note 42, at 76 (“Whilst it is still too
early to say for sure that these adoptions have been ‘successful’—adoption being a life-long, rather than
a short-term, project—the evidence so far does point to many positive outcomes for them.”).

44. See Ambrose & Coburn, supra note 42, at 2. The first report indicates that these problems were

probably very serious sometime before 1997. Thereafter, Romania adopted a more effective regulation of
adoptions. After that time, the more serious issue facing Romania was whether intercountry adoption
tended to divert attention and resources away from programs for in-country placement. See Dickens,
supra note 42, at 76–80.

45.

Dickens, supra note 42, at 78; Ambrose & Coburn, supra note 42, at 2.

46. See Dickens, supra note 42.
47.

Ambrose & Coburn, supra note 42, at 2.

48. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 281 (2004)

[hereinafter Smolin, Intercountry Adoption].

49. See, e.g., Shani King, Challenging Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We Think About

Intercountry Adoption, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 413, 437 (2009); David M. Smolin, Child Laundering: How
the Intercountry Adoption System Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practices of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnapping
and Stealing Children, 52 Wayne L. Rev. 113, 115 (2006) [hereinafter Smolin, Child Laundering].

50. See, e.g., Bowie, supra note 4, at 3, 14; Esben Leifsen, Person, Relation and Value, Cross-Cultural Approaches

to Adoption, in Cross-Cultural Approaches to Adoption, supra note 4, at 192–93.
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qualification, is useful ammunition to politicians whose real agenda may be different
from the best interests of children or who have an uninformed sense of the best
interests of children.
	Second, the tendency to generalize and stereotype to avoid the task of close
investigation is, unfortunately, not unique to politicians or other non-academics. The
academic literature of intercountry adoption includes many careless and negative
stereotypes of adoptive parents, supporters of adoption, and the adoption process.51
In some instances, the use of negative stereotypes might be intended to shock the
system into reform or to shock its participants into new ways of thinking. Other
stereotypes are the result of a misunderstanding of the law of adoption, frequently by
non-lawyer sociologists who misunderstand the law or the legal history of adoption.52
51.

Cynical critics of intercountry adoption routinely generalize in negative terms about the motives and
attitudes of adoptive parents. See, e.g., Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the
Best Interest of the Child?, 10 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 343, 343–47 (2004). Commenting as to the post
Korean War adoptions, Professor Berquist declares that “[p]rospective parents tended to make their
decisions based on religious or moral dictates to save the children from their fate as orphans and to
rescue them from the poverty and third-worldness of their country.” Id. at 344. Professor Berquist
grants that the motivations of adoptive parents have changed over time, but only from one negative
stereotype to another. Describing the period of the 1970s, she writes that “[t]he charitable inclinations
to provide families for parentless children seemed to transition to a more pseudo-altruistic need to make
a social statement about participation in and responsibility to crossing racial boundaries.” Id. at 346.
None of these statements about early intercountry adoptive parents appears to have been based on any
empirical evidence. However, after having conducted her own survey of later adoptive parents of Korean
children, Professor Berquist found that the primary motivations for adoption from Korea were “(1)
shorter waiting periods, and (2) an interest in international adoption.” Id. She interprets these results to
show “the pragmatism and parent-centered motivations in adoption and perhaps suggest a romanticization
or exoticization of the country of origin.” Id. at 346–47. See also Fonseca, supra note 4, who states that
the rhetoric of proponents of adoption “indirectly asserts the birth parent’s irresponsibility, absence of
moral fiber (inability to ‘plan’ their family), or lack of sexual constraint.” Id. at 176. Ms. Fonseca cites no
particular proponent or source for this “rhetoric.” Later, Ms. Fonsesca describes adoptive parents as
having “little compunction in linking their affluence to their right to adoptive parenthood,” and that
“adoptive parents also implied that considering the high price they were willing to pay . . . they expected
to get high quality goods: light skinned babies in good mental and physical health.” Id. (emphasis
added).

52.

For example, sociologists and social workers who comment on intercountry adoption frequently compare
the “open” nature of informal family placements in traditional cultures with the closed nature of U.S.
adoption law, in which records are sealed to prevent an adoptive child from learning of his adoptive
origins. Critics rely on this difference in practices to support their views that the typical American
adoptive parent seeks to hide the fact of adoption from an adoptive child, and to completely remove the
child from his or her cultural origin. See, e.g., Bowie, supra note 4, at 9; Melissa Demian, Transactions in
Rights, Transactions in Children, in Cross-Cultural Approaches to Adoption, supra note 4, at 97,
99. These descriptions are misleading for a number of reasons. First, intercountry adoptive parents have,
as a matter of choice, chosen a method of family building that usually makes “concealment” of adoption
impossible—especially if the adoption is interracial. Second, even in the case of domestic adoptions in
the United States there is a trend toward open adoption. See Jack Darcher, Market Forces in Domestic
Adoptions: Advocating a Quantitative Limit on Private Adoption Agency Fees, 8 Seattle J. for Soc. Just.
729, 739 (2010). This trend is matched by the development of “heritage tours” and other programs to
help adoptive children and their families maintain a link to their child’s cultural origin. See Bowie, supra
note 4, at 14–15; Dietrich Treide, Adoptions in Micronesia: Past and Present, in Cross-Cultural
Approaches to Adoption, supra note 4, at 127, 138. Third, the critics assume wrongly that adoptive
parents resist open adoption out of shame or to preserve the appearance of a biological family. However,
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Still, other stereotypes are circulated by observers who read too much into advertising
by adoption agencies that invoke the theme of rescuing children. Such advertising is
typical not just of adoption agencies, but of many other non-governmental
organizations that attract attention to their existence and their causes through the
image of the impoverished or orphaned child. It is wrong, however, to assume from
such advertising that all or most adoptive parents naively pursued adoption overseas
out of a sense of mission to “rescue” children from an inferior society.
For the vast majority of adoptive parents, adoption is probably first and foremost
a personal, individual, and entirely natural decision to build a family. Beyond this
core purpose, the variety of collateral motivations and values that may guide an
adoptive parent’s choice of and attitude toward intercountry adoption is neither fairly
nor productively reduced to stereotype.53 Nor is the adoption process the same in
every nation or community. Stereotypes are convenient evasions of the real complexity
of life, but they can cause harm to the people who are labeled, to our analysis of the
problems of adoption, to the public’s ability to understand the issues, and to the
process of reform. For example, it has now become common for the media to equate
“intercountry adoption,” or adoption in general, with “trafficking,” as if all adoptions
were part of a “child trade” based on the sale of children.54 Rhetoric and stereotyping
such as this are rarely good bases for educating the public or for policy-making.
Finally, the use of stereotypes and sensational but false or exaggerated charges
robs critics of credibility. Constructive reform is very much needed in intercountry
adoption, particularly in countries that are making a difficult transition into a new
stage of development. Sensational charges gain the public’s attention quickly,
particularly when children are at stake, but they lead to stiffened resistance to
constructive change when a falsehood is revealed.
Baroness Nicholson is an extreme case in point. She alleged that an immediate
ban against intercountry adoption was needed to stop “paedophilia, child prostitution
or domestic servitude.”55 Her charges were unfounded and distracted attention from
real issues, problems, and solutions. The subjects of the reports she cited related
mainly to the fact that Romanian social workers and orphanages seemed to favor
intercountry adoption over local placement because of the greater financial clout of
intercountry adoption agencies, the lack of resources for local placement, and a
rules that result in a termination of the legal relationship between the birth parent and the child are not
necessarily to make the adoption secret. Termination rules nurture bonding between the adoptive
parents and child by insuring against the risk that a birth parent might seek to reclaim possession and
custody, and they preserve the adoptive parents’ authority and prevent the possibility of a managerial
conflict between two sets of parents. These rules will likely continue to be needed no matter how “open”
adoption may become.
53.

See Demian, supra note 52, at 100. This characterization is not only mean-spirited, it is altogether
unlikely. Parents seeking a “perfect baby” in the modern era are much more likely to pursue parenthood
by assisted reproduction.

54. See Steve Farrar, Child Trade on Rise, Study Finds, Times Higher Educ., Aug. 30, 2002, http://www.

timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=171346&sectioncode=26.

55.

Nicholson, supra note 38.
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shortage of applicants for local foster or adoptive parenting. The resulting diversion
of children to foreign destinations is a problem if a child should generally be placed
within the culture, language, and ethnicity of the child’s birth, or if local placement
deserves at least a preference.56 Romania’s complete ban against intercountry adoption
was, in retrospect, the wrong solution because it was aimed at a different and
apparently non-existent problem.
		

2. The Argument for Preserving a Child’s Heritage

The argument for preserving every child’s assigned national, ethnic, or cultural
heritage is popular among nationalist politicians who oppose intercountry adoption
of children from their own communities.57 Proponents of the nationalist argument
assert that their position is supported by Article 20 of the CRC, which states that
“due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and
to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background” in any decision
about a child’s placement.58
The CRC does not explain the purpose or rationale of Article 20.59 According to
one argument for the preservation of heritage rule, children are personally harmed
by being separated from their place or culture of origin. Some opponents of
intercountry adoption argue that even the youngest adoptee—a newborn infant, for
example—may suffer psychological harm as a direct result of separation from his or
her cultural origin. Of course, there is no evidence that children are genetically
predisposed to a particular cultural identity.60
For infants, the more plausible “loss of identity” argument is that intercountry
adoption frequently results in mixed-race adoption, and that mixed-race adoption is
harmful to a child’s racial identity and development of coping skills against
discrimination.61 This argument does not necessarily lead to opposition to all
intercountry adoption. It relates only to intercountry adoption that results in a mixedrace family. However, studies of the impact of interracial adoption on child
development invariably show favorable outcomes as a statistical matter, at least in the

56. See Hourihane, supra note 36.
57.

See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 358–59; see also Dillon, supra note 22, at 217 & n.136.

58. CRC, supra note 9, art. 20 (emphasis added).
59.

Id. at pmbl. The Preamble states simply that the parties to the Convention have reached agreement after
“[t]aking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the
protection and harmonious development of the child.” Id.

60. See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 360–61 (summarizing evidence that children are not

born with an innate sense of culture).

61.

Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal
Theory, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism 101, 103 & n.12, 104 (1998) (describing, but not necessarily
subscribing to, this position).

746

VOLUME 55 | 2010/11

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

case of children adopted early enough to gain the best advantages of permanent
family placement.62
The argument that a child might be injured by separation from his or her cultural
origin is somewhat more plausible in the case of older children. One can imagine
that older children who have begun to develop a linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or
religious identity would normally be served best by true family placement within the
same group. 63 On the other hand, if the choice is between continued local
institutionalization versus intercountry adoption, the problem is much more complex,
which is why Article 20 does not state an absolute rule. It calls for “due regard.” For
an older child, the challenges of late adoption and the stress of a new setting may or
may not be more harmful than a few more years in an institution.64 However,
Baroness Nicholson’s extreme version of the cultural heritage argument goes well
beyond any requirement of “due regard.” For example, Baroness Nicholson has
asserted that children should remain in institutions if necessary to prevent their
removal by intercountry adoption.65 In her view, “due regard” should always lead to a
decision against intercountry adoption.
	Commitment to an institution for the sake of heritage in all cases is an acceptable
outcome for the extreme view if one believes that preservation of heritage—even in
an institution—is in the national or cultural interest, whether or not it is in any
particular child’s interest.66 For some proponents of cultural or ethnic solidarity, the
argument needs no further explanation. However, the cultural preservation argument
is more complex and variegated than it might seem. The sections that follow explore
some of the variations of this argument.
		

3. The Argument for Group Solidarity Against Out-of-Country Placement of a Child

	At least some proponents of the argument for preserving a child’s heritage are
impelled by a sense that members of a nation, culture, or ethnic group belong to the
group, and that intercountry adoption diverts some of the group’s children—the
62. Arnold R. Silverman & William Fiegelman, Adjustment in Interracial Adoptees: An Overview, in The

Psychology of Adoption 187, 193 (David Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990). Other
studies are summarized in Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 347–48, 360–61.

63. Unfortunately, “family” placement does not always mean adoption or even appropriate “foster” or

analogous care. What constitutes “family” placement can vary from society to society. In Haiti, for
example, “family” placement might be indentured servitude, which can run the gamut from work within
a nurturing relationship to work within a brutal relationship. See Haiti’s Dark Secret: The Restavecs,
Nat’l Public Radio (Mar. 27, 2004), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1779562.

64. See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 360–61.
65.

Hourihane, supra note 36 (discussing Baroness Nicholson’s views on the adoption of Romanian children).

66. For further discussion of such national or group rights views, see Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note

21, at 360–61. See also Benyam D. Mezmur, From Angelina (To Madonna) to Zoe’s Ark: What Are the ‘A –Z’
Lessons for Intercountry Adoptions in Africa? 23 Int’l J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 145, 153 (2009) [hereinafter
Mezmur, From Angelina (To Madonna)] (noting the absence of discussion or reference to the children’s
interests in local media and public discussion of the Angelina Jolie and Madonna adoptions of African
children); Mezmur, supra note 5, at 88 (describing nationalist views against intercountry adoption).
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group’s “future”—to the benefit of some other group. Proponents of this sort of group
solidarity often describe intercountry, interracial, or interethnic adoption as an act of
exploitation or assault. Characterized in this way, intercountry adoption often serves
as a reminder of historical grievances a group feels against a “dominant” group,
foreigners, or other outsiders.67
Unfortunately, history offers a number of precedents in which dominant cultures
have used child welfare policies to undermine or eradicate minority or economically
dependent cultures,68 and these historical facts can seem to justify suspicion of and
resistance to modern intercountry adoption. The problem is exacerbated by another
clash of cultures between local or international aid workers committed to ideas of
social justice versus affluent Westerners who aspire mainly to be parents, but who
seem to aid workers to be “shopping” for children.69 But prejudice against outplacement
of children need not be rooted in any record of exploitation or oppression. It might
simply be the product of everyday ethnocentrism or a natural human tendency to
view foreign culture, race, values, or lifestyle as alien influences against which we
must protect our children.70 One can easily imagine that some Americans would
object if large numbers of American-born children were being placed with Turkish,
Chinese, Mexican, or Nigerian couples.71
The fear that intercountry adoption deprives a child of his or her identity and
robs a nation or society of its children is a theme useful mainly to local politicians in
“sending” nations, but it echoes in “receiving” nations in the more sophisticated
critiques of some academicians. Professor Shani King, for example, is one of a number
of Western critics who believe that intercountry adoption is an act of exploitation or
an expression of neocolonialism or “monohumanism.” 72 Professor King writes:
67.

See, e.g., King, supra note 49; Bergquist, supra note 51, at 349–50.

68. Peter Read, The Stolen Generations: The Removal of Aboriginal Children in New South

Wales 1883 to 1969 (Dep’t Aboriginal Affairs New South Wales Gov’t 2006) (1981), available at http://
www.daa.nsw.gov.au/publications/StolenGenerations.pdf (describing Australian child welfare policies
that led to the removal of Aborigine children from their families); Melissa Eddy, Stolen: The Story of a
Polish Child Germanized by the Nazis, Star News Online (May 8, 2007, 3:30 AM), http://www.
starnewsonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070508/NEWS/705080331/-1/State (describing the
Nazis’ removal of Polish children from their families to be raised as Germans); Matthew Fletcher, Origins
of the Indian Child Welfare Act: A Survey of the Legislative History, Mich. St. Univ. C. of L., Indigenous
L. & Pol’y Ctr. (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.law.msu.edu/indigenous/papers/2009-04.pdf (describing
the policies of local officials in the United States for the placement of Native American children in nontribal families).

69. Demian, supra note 52, at 99–100; see also Dillon, supra note 22, at 256–57 (noting Professor Dillon’s

description of an exchange between prospective adoptive parents and a UNICEF official).

70. Perry, supra note 61, at 115–16 (describing the reaction of black women to white women who adopt

black children).

71.

In fact, some American children are placed overseas for adoption, mainly in Western Europe. AnneMarie O’Neill, Why Are American Babies Being Adopted Abroad?, People Mag., June 6, 2005, http://
www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20147746,00.html.

72. King, supra note 49, at 413–14. See also Christine W. Gailey, Race, Class and Gender in Intercountry

Adoption in the USA, in Intercountry Adoption: Developments, Trends and Perspectives 295,
298 (Peter Selman ed., 2000); Ryiah Lilith, Buying a Wife But Saving a Child: A Deconstruction of Popular
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides a legal framework
that establishes a child’s right to be raised in the context of her family and her
culture. We regularly violate this most fundamental right of children because
we fail to come to terms with our imperialist orientation toward the world.
This failure has been caused, in part, by how we have constructed our way of
thinking about intercountry adoption.73

Professor King’s argument is not necessarily a rejection of intercountry adoption
per se. The harm, he believes, stems from “our way of thinking” about adoption.
Still, his article includes a suggestion that adoption—and not just intercountry
adoption—has been an act of exploitation by one society against another. For
example, Professor King writes that “[t]he movement of children into the colonies
through slavery and indenture, and the so-called ‘orphan trains’ in the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century, were a precursor to modern-day ICA
[intercountry adoption].”74
Professor King cites no facts and explains no theory to support his assertion of a
historical connection between slavery and intercountry adoption. There is a historical
connection between indentured servitude and domestic adoption, but the link does
not support a portrayal of adoption as an instrument of exploitation. To the contrary,
social workers promoted modern adoption in the nineteenth century partly to prevent
indentured servitude of homeless children. Thus, adoption is a solution to, not an
evolutionary progression from, servitude. And servitude is not a “precursor” to
adoption, except in the sense that moral outrage over the servitude of children led to
campaigns to promote adoption. The orphan trains, of course, were a fact,75 but they
were no more connected to intercountry adoption than to domestic adoption. One of
the chief failings of the orphan trains is that they sometimes led to informal servitude
of children rather than adoption.
Professor King’s comparison of intercountry adoption with slavery and indentured
servitude is more likely intended as a metaphor than as a statement of fact. “Slavery”
incites an emotional response useful to the main theme of Professor King’s argument,
which is that intercountry adoption is exploitative. The exploitation is both a matter
of attitude and action. Professor King describes a belief system that he attributes to
adoptive parents and adoption agencies, which is that adoptive parents are part of a
superior nation, class, or society, and that they are rescuing orphans from a subordinate
class. Professor King also calls for “more attention to the possibility” that receiving
nations are in fact “exploiting developing countries and stealing their national
resources, i.e., their healthy children.” 76
Rhetoric and Legal Analysis of Mail-Order Brides and Intercountry Adoptions, 9 Buff. Women’s L.J. 225,
229 (2001).
73. King, supra note 49, at 414.
74.

Id. at 419.

75. See Trammell, supra note 6, at 3–7.
76. King, supra note 49, at 436.
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	Like the nationalist argument, the anti-exploitation argument focuses mainly on
national interests, historical wrongs, and the unequal relationships among nations,
and it avoids much consideration of how any individual child’s interests might favor
or disfavor intercountry adoption.77 Professor King, for example, appears simply to
dismiss scientific evidence that prolonged institutionalization is harmful to children.
He believes that the medical argument for early adoption disguises the real motive of
Western adoptive parents, which is to “launder” children of their natural origins:
Legal scholars actively promote the notion that the younger children should
be taken away from their country conditions as soon as possible, in order to
avoid mental and physical problems that develop with age. This, in turn,
creates an urgency to extract infants and young children from the developing
world. This could also be characterized as the desire for a clean slate: a baby
or young child unconditioned by his or her native environment. And, after a
“quick extraction,” the ICA bureaucracies allow the infant or child adoptee to
gain expeditious citizenship in the United States, which completes the process
of “laundering” the child for the parents who may desire an unadulterated
newborn child.78

	Despite Professor King’s belief that the current practice of intercountry adoption
is a form of neocolonialism or monohumanism, he concedes that there may be a valid
but limited role for intercountry adoption in a world cleansed of colonialism. However,
he proposes that intercountry adoption should be preceded by transfers of wealth
from receiving nations and adoptive parents on a scale sufficient to substantially
reduce or eliminate the economic reasons why children around the world may need
new families.79
	Another advocate for the view that intercountry adoption is an act or expression
of exploitation is Professor Twila Perry.80 Professor Perry’s recent work regarding
adoption relates mainly to the problem of domestic interracial adoption by white
adoptive parents of black adoptive children, but she finds that intercountry adoption
presents some analogous political issues of oppression by one group against another.
Like Professor King, she seeks a new way of thinking and speaking about intercountry
adoption, not necessarily a blanket prohibition.
Professor Perry begins her analysis by stating, “I am not opposed to transracial or
international adoption . . . . [F]or some children, transracial or international adoption
may be the option that is in their best interests at the particular time.”81 Still, like
Professor King, Professor Perry believes that the right priority for scholars—
particularly feminist scholars—is to develop a correct political framework for
adoption. Her analysis is based “not on the social science data exploring the social
77.

See Perry, supra note 61, at 134–35, 141–42.

78. King, supra note 49, at 437.
79. See id. at 464–65.
80. See Perry, supra note 61, at 105.
81.

Id. at 107–08.
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adjustment of transracially adopted Black children, but on the political implications
of the legal discourse surrounding the issue.”82
Professor Perry views interracial and intercountry adoption as part of a continuing
act of exploitation by dominant societies against weaker societies.83 And like other
critics who focus on themes of exploitation, she finds the issue of children’s interests
to be subordinate to the political and racial connotations of different of types of
adoption. Thus, she writes:
The emphasis on the need of individual children for adoptive homes in which
they will be nurtured on a one-on-one basis comes at the expense of thinking
harder about the political and economic circumstances that shape the lives of
so many more children in this society and in the world . . . . For feminists,
adoption, like marriage, must be analyzed as a political institution in which
issues of rights, inequality and the potential for exploitation must be central.84

There are several responses to this sort of group solidarity against the outplacement
of children. First, children raised in institutions or other non-family environments
are very likely to be released into the community as older teenagers with little or no
family support, and often with serious physical and emotional disabilities caused or
exacerbated by institutionalization.85 They might become more of a burden than a
resource for their communities. Second, the CRC—the same document that demands
“due regard” for a child’s original culture—also recognizes the importance of family
placement and states that “the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.” But proponents of group solidarity against adoption fail to accord any
weight to children’s interests. Third, the number of children placed out of their
nations of origin by intercountry adoption is quite small. The total number of
intercountry adoptions does not appear ever to have exceeded 50,000 in a single year
for the entire world.86 The total for any single nation is unlikely to pose a major threat
to any nation’s future demographics.
82. Id. at 114.
83. Id. at 135.
84. Id. at 147.
85. In Moldova, for example, a law for adoption is evidently rarely used. Orphaned children are more likely

to be raised in institutions until they are fifteen or sixteen years of age and then released with the
equivalent of seventy dollars. UNICEF, Trafficking in Human Beings in South East Europe 82
n.128 (2004), available at http://www.unicef.org/media/files/2004Focus_on_Prevention_in_SEE.pdf.
The problem of release upon “adulthood” is not just a problem for developing nations, and it is not
just a problem for institutionalization. Foster care frequently leads to the same outcome. Human Rights
Watch recently reported that, in California, many children raised in foster care are often released as
adults with little or no family or public support, and 20% become homeless adults. Human Rights
Watch, My So-Called Emancipation: From Foster Care to Homelessness for California
Youth 1 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/05/12/my-so-called-emancipation-0.

86. See Int’ l Adoption Statistics, supra note 1; see also Peter Selman, Intercountry Adoption in the New

Millennium: The “Quiet Migration” Revisited, 21 Population Res. & Pol’y Rev. 205, 217 (2002) (on file
with author) (showing the number of adoptions per 100,000 children under the age of five in various
sending nations).
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Finally, if the notion of a rule promoting the “best interests” of children means
anything, it includes a limit on the degree to which children may be sacrificed for
anyone’s religion, political ideology, or theory of group solidarity.87 Theories of
historical injustice or group interests that are premised on the irrelevance of the
interests of this generation of children do not remedy injustice. They substitute one
injustice for another.
		

4. Discounting the Benefits of Intercountry Adoption

	Cynical critics who elevate group interests over the interests of children have
another argument that is less an attack against intercountry adoption than an effort
to deflect criticism of their own position: intercountry adoption may be beneficial for
the child who is adopted, but it does nothing to benefit other children who are not
adopted.88 When presented as an independent reason to oppose adoption, it is a
peculiar view that we should deny a child’s adoption if he or she is the only child who
will benefit. Of course, adoption is designed to benefit one child at a time. Sadly,
some children who might benefit from adoption will not be adopted due, at least in
part, to political and ideological resistance to adoption. When international aid
organizations make the limited benefit argument, it is even more peculiar. Would an
international aid group deny medical care to one child because another child, on the
other side of the village, might not get care he also needed?
There are a number of reasons why there might be some appeal in opposing
adoption because of its limited benefits. From the point of view of an international
aid worker, an adoptive parent’s expenditure of tens of thousands of dollars to adopt
only one child—and many, many thousands more for health care, education, and
other living expenses for that one child—might seem wasteful.89 International aid
workers deal with a never-ending critical shortage of resources for children. The
money that wealthy or middle-class Westerners spend on many other things for
themselves and their children must seem frivolous in comparison with the paltry
resources that children remaining in institutions receive. Instead of bearing the costs
of adoption and years of child rearing for one particular child, why not forbear that
child’s adoption and donate the same money to an orphanage to provide a modest
level of institutional support for that child and other institutionalized children?
But the choice presented by this line of thought is misleading. It serves only to
erect a false moral ground for opposition to intercountry adoption. Intercountry
adoption is not a choice “not to save” children who remain in institutions. It is a
fulfillment of one parent’s or one couple’s desire for a child, happily matched with
one child’s need. If the prospective parents did not seek to adopt a child, their money

87.

See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–70 (1944).

88. See, e.g., Bergquist, supra note 51, at 349–50.
89. By one estimate, the cost of intercountry adoption now ranges from $15,000 to $40,000. Bartholet,

Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 168.
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would go elsewhere, perhaps to assisted reproduction90 or purely self-indulgent, nonparental expenditures. Not having sought to adopt, these non-adoptive parents would
be no more likely than anyone else to have developed any connection or commitment
with any particular orphanage or aid organization. They would be no more obliged
than anyone else to send any amount of their money to orphanages. The fact that
some wealthy or middle-class Westerners choose to have children and are willing to
pay for intercountry adoption is not ground for moral condemnation. If it were, all of
us who are parents by any means should be ashamed for having children instead of
sending our surplus funds to orphanages.
There is at least one other reason why cynics might believe it is important that
intercountry adoption save one child but not others. The argument might seem to
rebut a claim that intercountry adoption is an answer for all children in need of
proper family care.91 However, this imagined claim is nothing but a diversionary
straw man. The promotion of intercountry adoption has not been based on an
argument that intercountry adoption will provide an answer for all children in need.92
Supporters often refer to statistics showing that large numbers of children—probably
many millions—lack effective family care,93 but these numbers simply establish that
there really are likely to be some lesser, but still large, number of children who could
benefit from intercountry adoption.94 Citing statistics of need is not a commitment to
address the problem by any single means. Indeed, it is very unlikely that adoption
could ever be available for more than a fraction of these children, even under the
most liberal legal regimes. But there is no rule that a practice or social policy beneficial
to some persons should be barred unless it benefits all. If there were such a rule, why
should it apply only to adoption and not to any other form of aid that reaches some
but not all children and families?
		

5. Effects on Children Left Behind

The fact that intercountry adoption does not reach all children is an irrational
reason to oppose it. A more important issue is whether intercountry adoption harms
or benefits parties other than adoptive parents and adopted children. If intercountry
adoption were harmful to some unadopted children, for example, one might well
question whether intercountry adoption is in the best interest of children at large,
even if it benefits only adopted children. Indeed, some cynical critics of adopters
90. Adoption competes with other methods of becoming a parent, such as sperm donation, donated embryo

implantation, and surrogate motherhood. See John E. Buster, The First Live Birth Donation, 6 Sexuality,
Reprod. & Menopause 23 (2008), available at http://www.obgmanagement.com/srm/pdf/first_live_
birth_donation.pdf (reporting that in 2006, there were 6,480 live births from embryo/oocyte donation
in the United States alone, and that the frequency of this procedure is trending strongly upward).

91.

Professor Shani King, for example, appears to use this line of reasoning. King, supra note 49, at 425.

92.

Of course, it is impossible to prove a negative. The author is unaware of any supporters of adoption who
have claimed that it will solve the problems of all children in need.

93.

See, e.g., Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 182–83.

94. See infra Part III.
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have argued that adoption does affect other children, and that its effects are generally
bad. However, the argument that intercountry adoption harms unadopted children
rests on highly speculative and probably erroneously assumed links between
intercountry adoption and the suffering of children who remain in institutions or
other desperate situations. The “harm to other children” argument also ignores the
many ways intercountry adoption indirectly benefits children who are not adopted.
	As the Romanian episode demonstrated, a substantial part of the cynical attitude
toward intercountry adoption derives from a natural concern for the welfare of
children who will not be adopted. Social workers are particularly prone to worry that
intercountry adoption might indirectly worsen the condition of children left behind.95
Social workers responsible for the ongoing care of children—not just for adoptions—
naturally see children’s interests quite broadly as including all the children under
their care, most of whom will never gain the benefit of intercountry adoption.
Sending nations are likewise legitimately concerned about those who remain.
	Intercountry adoption might affect the children left behind in two ways. First, the
sorting of children into “most adoptable” and “least likely to be adopted” stigmatizes
children left behind.96 Whether the situation of children left behind is really any
worse than it otherwise would have been is difficult to know. Social workers who
work in the context of this process are understandably disturbed by it. Nevertheless, it
is likely that any system of placement—even one exclusively for local placement—is
likely to involve some sorting of children. Nations that have successfully promoted
domestic adoption have witnessed the same sorting process, and local cultural practices
might cause local adoptive parents to be even more particular than foreign parents
about the traits they are seeking in a child.97 In fact, in some sending nations, the
most highly favored children are now reserved for local placement, and only children
who are unadoptable under local standards are placed through intercountry adoption.98
Thus, the classification and stigmatization that intercountry adoption might seem to
cause is probably no different from the classification and stigmatization that domestic
placement can and will cause wherever it is a viable option. Classification caused by
intercountry adoption is simply more obvious, especially to local social workers, if
affluent foreign adoptive parents seem to be “shopping.”
The other way in which intercountry adoption might affect children left behind
is if intercountry adoption actually diverts money and resources from other social
services, including local family placement. The diversion might occur because
intercountry adoption produces substantial revenue for orphanages, which then focus

95. See Ambrose & Coburn, supra note 42, at 2; Dickens, supra note 42, at 76.
96. Some writers have called this the commodification of children because it assigns monetary values to

them based on particular traits. I believe “stigmatization” better captures the real problem.

97.

See Barbara Yngvesson, National Bodies and the Body of the Child: “Completing” Families Through
International Adoption, in Cross-Cultural Approaches to Adoption, supra note 4, at 211, 217–18;
see also Dillon, supra note 22, at 196 n.52 (describing the situation in Brazil).

98. See Baldauf et al., supra note 1; Yngvesson, supra note 97, at 217–18.
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on adoption, not family preservation or other services.99 However, what appears to be
diversion might simply be a matter of comparison. In other words, the resources
devoted to intercountry adoption make the resources available for other services seem
small by comparison, raising a suspicion of diversion. But appearances can be
deceiving. Intercountry adoption might in fact be generating more funds for
competing services than it diverts. Indeed, many sending nations now require
adoption agencies or adoptive parents to pay extra fees or “donations” to support
orphanages or for other social services, and these fees appear to have been helpful in
improving conditions in the orphanages.100 Moreover, prospective adoptive parents
who visit orphanages appear to have been important forces in campaigns to correct
deficient conditions at some orphanages, to raise money or public allocations for
orphanages, and to improve the management and care of children in orphanages.101
In the case of Romania, the improvement in the conditions at many orphanages, the
development of local foster care, and the reform of child welfare laws are inseparable
from the phenomenon of intercountry adoption.102
Thus, fears that intercountry adoption might harm children left behind appear to
be unfounded. Intercountry adoption has actually been a positive force not only for
children placed out of their home countries, but also for those who remain. A properly
designed and regulated system of intercountry adoption really is in the best interests
of all children. Efforts to bar intercountry adoption will deprive some children of a
needed opportunity and are more likely to perpetuate than alleviate deleterious
conditions in local orphanages.
		

6. Effects on Birth Parents

The most credible and important argument against intercountry adoption is
related to the effect of adoption on the birth family. It begins with a proposition with
which all critics and supporters of adoption probably agree: the process of qualifying a
child for adoption should not cause unnecessary or unjustifiable loss or harm to the
birth parent. One could also speak of possible harm to the larger birth family:
grandparents, aunts and uncles, and so on. For purposes of the present analysis, the
focus will be on harm to birth parents, whose interests with respect to their own child
are properly and universally recognized. Harm to an extended family is also a problem
that deserves attention, but resolving that problem involves an extremely complex task
of definition and weighing interests. For example, should we account for the interests
99. Dickens, supra note 42.
100. See, e.g., Jane Gross & Will Connors, Surge in Adoptions Raises Concern in Ethiopia, N.Y. Times, June 4,

2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/us/04adopt.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2.

101. See Bowie, supra note 4, at 14–15 (providing examples from India and China); see also Bartholet, The

Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 351.

102. See generally Indep. Grp. for Int’l Adoption Analysis, Re-Organising the International

Adoption and Child Protection System (Mar. 2002) (on file with author). Russia may be another
case in which intercountry adoption spurred reform of the local child welfare system. See also Baldauf et
al., supra note 1.
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of grandparents in deciding whether to uphold a birth parent’s relinquishment of a
child for adoption by non-family members? Defining the circle of persons whose
interests are worthy of protection and imagining a process for protecting those interests
are problems acknowledged but beyond the scope of this paper.103
	In some adoption cases, there is little or no possibility of loss to a birth parent
because she is dead or in some sense unavailable (as the father may be in some cultures
or circumstances). In these situations, an adoption cannot be said to cause any loss to
the birth parent.104 In other situations, the birth parent may suffer a loss, but the loss
is due to his or her conduct, such as where a court has justifiably terminated the
parent-child relationship because of abuse or neglect. In these cases, adoption or
other family placement might be essential to protect the child from serious harm or
death, regardless of the loss to the birth parent. The loss the birth parent suffers in
this sort of case is widely acknowledged to be necessary and unavoidable. However,
there are two other situations in which the birth parent’s loss is a matter of real
concern for the adoption system.
First, the relinquishment might not be voluntary because it was obtained by
corruption caused directly or indirectly by the local system or practice of adoption.
The problem of corrupted relinquishments is discussed at length in Part II.D because
it is mainly an issue for the moderate critics of intercountry adoption. If the problem
of corruption can reasonably be limited, it calls for reform, not outright prohibition.
	Second, even a truly voluntary placement could be a loss to the birth parent if she
would have kept the child but for economic distress, and she grieves the relinquishment.
This loss probably does occur to some degree in most voluntary relinquishments.
Whether the loss requires us to abandon adoption, except in the case of deceased or
terminated birth parents, depends on whether the loss is otherwise avoidable. If the
birth mother would have failed to find the minimum means to care for the child and
prevent the child’s death or severe illness, or if the birth mother would have placed
the child in an orphanage or lost the child to true “traffickers,”105 then we should
grieve with the birth mother, but we should not deny her the option to place the
child for adoption.
Professor David Smolin has considered the problem of voluntary relinquishment
in one of his critiques against intercountry adoption.106 Professor Smolin might best
103. The interests of an extended family might be the true heart of the debate over group interests claimed

by clans, tribes, villages, and even nations. In the Western world, we tend to think in terms of an
extended family. In some parts of the developing world, a clan might be the more important concept.
See, e.g., Demian, supra note 52, at 105.

104. I am laying aside, for the moment, the situation in which the birth parents are lost with some hope of

rediscovery, perhaps because of war or natural disaster.

105. See Donna M. Hughes et al., Nepal, Trafficking, Coal. Against Trafficking in Women, http://www.

uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/nepal.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). Professor Hughes estimates that in
Nepal alone, several thousand young girls are sold into prostitution every year. Id. Parents sell their
daughters at prices ranging from $200 to $600. Id.

106. See David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty: A Human Rights Analysis, 36 Cap. U. L. Rev.

413, 426 (2007) [hereinafter Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty].
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be described as a moderate critic because most of his arguments lean toward reform,
not an outright ban or condemnation of intercountry adoption. His chief concerns
are with unethical practices such as financial inducements, bribery, and kidnapping
of children.107 However, his argument about a birth parent’s loss in a voluntary
relinquishment could lead to the conclusion that adoption—particularly intercountry
adoption—is frequently unethical even if it passes the usual tests of legality. It might
be a perfect argument for a cynical critic or absolute opponent of intercountry
adoption.
Professor Smolin’s argument rests on a comparison of the cost of adoption with
the cost of helping the poor remain parents. It is indisputable that many birth parents
who voluntarily place their children for adoption do so because of poverty. With
financial aid, some might remain parents. One might say that the loss such birth
parents suffer is avoidable by providing financial aid. Is this the sort of loss that
makes adoption wrong? Professor Smolin reasons, “As an ethical matter, it is perverse
to spend thousands of dollars taking a child from the birth family, when a much
smaller sum would have kept the family intact.”108 Taken to its logical conclusion,
Professor Smolin’s argument might suggest that many domestic adoptions as well as
intercountry adoptions are unethical. Even in domestic adoptions, economic
circumstances are likely to be a major cause of voluntary relinquishment.
The ethical dilemma described by Professor Smolin’s hypothetical is not
necessarily one faced by the adoptive parents. Adoptive parents do not “take” a child
from a birth parent. In a proper adoption, the birth parent relinquishes the child for
adoption without financial inducement or coercion by any party—most especially
the adoptive parents. In an ideal adoption system, the adoptive parents are completely
removed from the birth parent’s decision and her act of relinquishment.109 One or
more “intermediaries” counsel the birth parent, receive the relinquishment and the
child, and place the child with adoptive parents. The “ethical” decision imagined by
Professor Smolin is faced by the intermediary: Should he offer money to discourage
the relinquishment, or should he simply accept the relinquishment with no payment
of money?110
107. See Smolin, Intercountry Adoption, supra note 48, at 310; David M. Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry

Adoption: The Significance of the Indian Adoption Scandals, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 403, 403–04 (2005)
[hereinafter Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption]; Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty,
supra note 106, at 433–34.

108. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption, supra note 48, at 310.
109. In some jurisdictions that permit independent or direct placement, including some U.S. states, adoptive

parents may in fact be involved in the relinquishment decision and act. See Andrea Carroll, Re-Regulating
the Baby-Market: A Call for a Ban on Payment of Birth Mother Living Expenses, U. Kan. L. Rev.
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1597216. However, this
is not a problem inherent in adoption—intercountry or otherwise.

110. See Smolin, Intercountry Adoption, supra note 48, at 314–18. There is of course a third option: to pay the

birth parent to relinquish the child, but selection of this option is neither ethical nor lawful. There is an
important issue of whether financial inducements play a significant role in relinquishments, either in
violation of the law or by opportunistic use of loopholes in the law. Id.
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This hypothetical choice would be important if it actually demonstrated that a
birth mother’s loss is avoidable and that her loss is caused by the adoption system
when the system denies the necessary aid. However, Professor Smolin does not
propose to prohibit intercountry adoption. Instead, he proposes a cure: “[W]here the
birth parents live under or near the international poverty standard of $1 per day,
family preservation assistance must be provided or offered as a condition precedent
for accepting a relinquishment that would make the child eligible for intercountry
adoption.”111 Professor Smolin estimates that $300 would typically be enough to
enable a birth family to avoid relinquishment of the child. The cost would be funded
by adoption fees necessarily exceeding more than $300 per application. Most birth
parents—Professor Smolin estimates about 90%—might choose not to relinquish
after receiving aid. In other words, each adoptive parent or couple would need to pay
for the cost of processing one binding relinquishment plus a proportionate cost of
financially inducing some number of revocations. Professor Smolin estimates that
the total cost of aid per application might be $3300.112
Professor Smolin’s hypothetical works as a sensitizing device, but not as a practical
proposal. Whatever final shape the proposal might take, it would necessarily be
carried out by local authorities, and in that regard there are some precedents for what
Professor Smolin has proposed. In the United States, for example, a “maternity
home” connected with an adoption agency might offer unconditional room, board,
and medical services for pregnant women in need. The home’s costs are born to some
degree by adoptive parents who pay fees to adopt children whose birth mothers
accepted the home’s services. Adoptive parents also probably bear some part of the
cost of services for women who decide after a lengthy stay not to place their children
for adoption through the agency that sponsors the maternity home. This arrangement
may be an important factor in the extraordinary expense of domestic adoption.
Overseas, orphanages and local governments sometimes require the payment of extra
fees for adoption services. The funds collected by such fees are intended to provide
for a variety of projects, including the upgrading of orphanages and family services.
Again, extra fees increase the cost of intercountry adoption.
Experience gained by many international family aid services sheds some light on
the likely challenges of a proposal to provide more aid for preserving families and
preventing relinquishment. Suppose, for example, that the allocation of funds raised
by adoption fees goes directly to local authorities, orphanages, and other
intermediaries. First, there are the usual problems of corruption.113 If the problem of
corruption in gaining relinquishments is as grave as many moderate critics believe it
is, the process of distributing an even greater amount of funds to avoid relinquishment
is likely to be at least equally corrupt. Second, if the funds were used to provide for
the construction and improvement of local orphanages—which tend to benefit local
111. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty, supra note 106, at 415.
112. See id. at 445.
113. See Celia W. Dugger, Aid Gives Alternative to African Orphanages, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2009, http://

www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/africa/06orphans.html.
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officials and draw still more international aid—this may increase long-term
institutionalization of children because desperately poor families, rightly or wrongly,
come to view orphanages as a better environment than their own family environment.114
Moreover, to the extent the availability of such funding is clearly linked to intercountry
adoption, local officials are all the more likely to favor intercountry adoption over the
development of local family placement.115
	Alternatively, the money intended to avoid relinquishment or institutionalization
might be paid directly to birth families. Early experience with direct cash benefits
shows some promise when the funds are distributed simply on the basis of need.116
However, considering that there are millions of children in orphanages around the
world and many more in desperately poor family environments,117 it would probably
take a very large sum of money to put more than a small dent in the number of
children being institutionalized, relinquished for adoption, or simply abandoned.
Finally, one might distribute money directly to a smaller group of birth parents:
those who we know or predict would otherwise place their children for adoption.
The problems of managing such a program would be staggering. If the money were
paid as an inducement not to relinquish, what would be the price for nonrelinquishment? Would it be an amount sufficient to overcome an immediate crisis,
or an amount sufficient to change the birth parent’s life for the long term? Will the
birth parent have a legal obligation not to institutionalize or place the child for
adoption if she has received an earlier non-relinquishment payment? What if a birth
parent never really intended to place the child for adoption, but was simply appealing
for a fee? Is it fair to distribute money to an impoverished birth family we know or
predict will otherwise relinquish their child, but no money at all to an equally
impoverished family we predict will not relinquish their child?
Professor Smolin’s proposal could not succeed in the real world. Nevertheless, it
serves as a reminder that the difference between desperation and subsistence is very
small in the developing world, especially when compared with what aff luent
Westerners might spend on any number of things—including the adoption of
children. Perhaps the Western world should do more to fund family services
throughout the world. However, there is no reason why adoptive parents should bear
this burden alone. They have already made a much larger contribution in accepting
the burden of raising a child to adulthood. Moreover, raising adoption fees to fund
new social welfare initiatives will accelerate the extinction of the middle class from
the world of adoption. If we owe the world better funding for family services, we
should all bear that burden as taxpayers.
114. Id.
115. See D. Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption: Assessing the

Gatekeepers, 34 Cap. U. L. Rev. 349, 398 (2005). For a further discussion of this problem, see infra Part
II.C.7.

116. See Dugger, supra note 113.
117. See infra Part III.

759

Seeking the Better Interests of Children

To come full circle, the harm that birth parents suffer when they relinquish a
child solely because of economic despair is not a harm the adoption system can avoid.
The adoption system did not cause the birth parent’s despair, and any effort to use
the adoption system to lift birth parents from poverty is very likely to fail, or even to
backfire. If the adoption system seems “perverse,” it is because of a paradox that one
family’s tragedy becomes the cause of another’s joy. Adoptive parents should know
this, but knowing it is no reason to abandon a pursuit that may be the birth parent’s
last and best option.
		

7. Effects on Local Prospective Adoptive Parents

	Children and birth families are not the only persons who might arguably feel the
effects of intercountry adoption. Local prospective adoptive parents are another
group on whose behalf cynical critics frequently raise an objection. Intercountry
adoption might divert adoptions away from local prospective adoptive parents to
foreign adoptive parents. Foreign adoptive parents might be able to pay higher fees,
and the money they offer might incentivize orphanages or other intermediaries to
favor intercountry adoption.118 As noted in Part II.C.5, this sort of diversion was a
key issue in the reaction against intercountry adoption in Romania, and it has been a
key part of the cynical critics’ ongoing argument against intercountry adoption.
	Sending nations might also see any such diversion of placements as a problem. If
a local government is accountable at all to its citizens, it may have no choice but to
address complaints of local parents who want to adopt but who believe their efforts
are or will be frustrated by foreign adoptive parents, especially if it appears that the
greater wealth of foreigners—rather than comparative parenting skill—is the reason
for the diversion.
Protecting and facilitating the opportunity of local parents to adopt can be
consistent with the goal of family placement and the best interests of adoptable
children. However, it is bad policy and detrimental to the best interests of children to
promote local placement by prohibiting or unduly restricting intercountry adoption.
Restricting intercountry adoption could be counterproductive because there
might not be any real diversion. There might, in fact, be a significant shortage of
local parents wanting or willing to adopt unrelated children.119 Critics of intercountry
adoption tend to be very optimistic about the possibilities for local placement even
for nations in which there is no tradition or culture of “adoption” as we know it in the
Western world. Optimists typically suggest that the lack of formal adoption in some
communities is an illusion, that substitute parenting is a universal practice having
many cultural forms, and that communities that do not practice Western-style formal
118. See Dickens, supra note 42, at 76, 80; Blair, supra note 115, at 374–79.
119. See, e.g., Rankin, supra note 39, at 285–86 (describing the continuing shortage of local adoptive parents

in Romania); Chloe Arnold, Russia: More Parents Sought for Domestic Adoption, Radio Free Eur./
Radio Liberty ( July 13, 2007), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077616.html [hereinafter
Arnold, Russia]; Clifford J. Levy, Russian Orphanage Offers Love, But Not Families, N.Y. Times, May 3,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/world/europe/04adopt.html.
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adoption do practice other forms of child placement outside the nuclear family.120
These assertions miss the heart of the problem. Many of the cultural variations for
child placement involve informal arrangements for the care of a child within an
extended family, clan, or otherwise related group.121 For any of a variety of reasons,
some children fall outside effective social networks. Moreover, in some settings even
the concepts of extended family, clan, or other social units have dissolved because of
urbanization or social upheaval.122 These forms of child care might be sufficient
where they are available, but they have obviously failed children who languish in
orphanages around the world.123
Part of the problem may be economic. There are not enough substitute parents
with sufficient resources and motivation to support another family’s child. However,
another large source of the problem is that long-term substitute parenting of
completely unrelated children is not a universal cultural practice.124 For many children
who are in or destined for institutions, the local variations of family placement have
fallen short. Local variations based on an extended family or clan are simply not
available for these children for any of a multitude of reasons, including war,
urbanization undermining family values, or other social factors eroding traditional or
idealized ways of life. Whatever the reasons, millions of children in institutions have
not benefitted at all from alternative forms of family placement. For some number of
these children, intercountry adoption might be an option—and the only alternative—to
long-term institutionalization.
When there are not enough local prospective adoptive parents, a ban on
intercountry adoption sentences otherwise adoptable children to prolonged
institutionalization.125 In Romania, for example, authorities understandably sought
to promote local family placement for many children in orphanages, but a shortage of
local foster or adoptive parents resulted in the continued institutionalization of
thousands of children.126 Other countries have sought to transition gradually to local
placement by granting various forms of preference for local parents and against
120. See, e.g., Bowie, supra note 4, at 14; Demian, supra note 52, at 97–110; Treide, supra note 52, at 127–41;

Ernst Halbmayer, “The One Who Feeds Has the Rights”: Adoption and Fostering of Kin, Affines and Enemies
Among the Yupka and Other Carib-Speaking Indians of Lowland South America, in Cross-Cultural
Approaches to Adoption, supra note 4, at 145–64.

121. Demian, supra note 52, at 105.
122. See Arnold, Russia, supra note 119.
123. See Dillon, supra note 22, at 183–85; Mezmur, supra note 5, at 94–95.
124. See Dillon, supra note 22, at 223 & nn.158–59; see also Leifsen, supra note 50, at 207. Cultural differences

regarding adoption are not limited to a comparison between the “developed” world versus the
“developing” world. Even some Western nations do not have a culture or tradition that is strongly
supportive of adoption. See Bowie, supra note 4, at 10–11 (describing a continued “anti-adoption” culture
in the United Kingdom and a tendency to mask or deny adoption).

125. See Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 193 (describing the effect of Russia’s

six-month waiting period and India’s domestic/intercountry quota system).

126. See Rankin, supra note 39, at 280 (describing the continued institutionalization of children because of a

lack of local adoptive parents); see also Blair, supra note 115, at 400–01.
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foreign parents.127 However, restrictions can have the effect of delaying placement of
a child as authorities wait for a final determination that all local options are exhausted
before turning to intercountry adoption.128 Delay for the sake of local adoptive
placement increases the risk of harm to the child’s mental and physical development,
and makes the child’s later transition and attachment to a new family even more
difficult.129
	A policy of discouraging intercountry adoption combined with a persistent
shortage of local adoptive parents can also seem like a justification for local authorities
to promote “foster” care in lieu of adoption. As noted earlier, international law could
be interpreted to encourage preferences for local foster care over intercountry
adoption. Whether this is consistent with the best interests of children placed in
foster care depends on what constitutes foster care,130 whether foster parents are
available in sufficient numbers, and whether there are sufficient safeguards against
bad foster care. In Romania, a preference for local foster care resulted in continued
institutionalization of children because of a shortage of foster as well as adoptive
parents.131 In Haiti, what might pass for foster care is actually a form of indentured
servitude.132 Even in the Western world, foster care has not always been equated with
nurturing family care. In some cases, foster care might be only a very short step
removed from institutionalization.133 One inherent difference between foster care
and adoption is the lack of permanency and stability in a foster relationship.134 This
127. Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 192–93.
128. Id.
129. Dr. Dana Johnson, Dir. Int’l Adoption Clinic, Univ. of Minn., In the Best Interest of the Children? Romania’s

Ban on Intercounty Adoption: Helsinki Commission Hearing Before the United States Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://csce.gov/index.cfm? FuseAction=Content
Records.ViewWitness&ContentRecord_id=677&ContentType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentTyp
e=H&CFID=49170199&CFTOKEN=13813725 (“[I]n infancy, hospital or orphanage care for longer
than 4–6 months can cause permanent alterations in cognitive, emotional and behavioral development. A
reasonable estimate is that an infant looses about 1–2 IQ points/month, and sustains predictable losses in
growth as well as motor and language development between 4 and 24 months of age while living in an
institutional care environment.”). See also Blair, supra note 115, at 394–95.

130. See generally Wardle, supra note 22 (discussing the wide range of what constitutes “foster care”). Professor

Wardle notes that foster care is sometimes a “euphemism for cottage-industry-level institutionalization,
with children being farmed out to live with a band of parentless children in a small-scale orphanage run
by a small staff of under-resourced adults.” Id. at 341.

131. See Rankin, supra note 39, at 277–78.
132. See Child Trafficking and Abuse in Haiti: IOM Efforts to Rescue Restaveks, Int’l Org. for Migration, 1,

http://www.iom.int/unitedstates/Home/Restavek%20info%20sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011)
[hereinafter IOM, Child Trafficking & Abuse in Haiti].

133. See Michael Bohman & Soren Sigvardsson, Outcome in Adoption: Lessons from Longitudinal Studies, in

The Psychology of Adoption, supra note 62, at 93–95, 105; John Triseliotis & Maclom Hill,
Contrasting Adoption, Foster Care, and Residential Rearing, in The Psychology of Adoption, supra, at
107, 111–15.

134. See Rankin, supra note 39, at 278 (describing a study of Romanian foster care that found that “foster

caregivers tend to adopt a professional relationship with the child, which is ‘not in the best interest of
the child, as professionalism does not imply sacrifice or total commitment like that of a parent’”).
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lack of stability affects the strength of the emotional commitment between a child
and his or her foster parents, and it also undermines the child’s sense of security.135
Thus, a preference for local foster care over intercountry adoption can be nearly as
bad as a preference for institutionalization, unless authorities can assure that there
are in fact sufficient numbers of foster parents and that foster care really qualifies as
nurturing “family” care.
	It is also doubtful whether foster parenthood represents an aspiration or demand
that local authorities ought to seek to fulfill. Unless prospective foster parents have a
pre-existing connection with the child, their service as foster parents might be more
analogous to employment than a family relationship, especially if they have declined
to adopt a child and their offer to be foster parents depends on significant
compensation.136 The government’s payment for such foster care in lieu of intercountry
adoption might be an unnecessary drain on resources that could otherwise be used
for other children and family services.
Foster care best deserves a special preference over intercountry adoption when
the child is old enough to have developed an emotional attachment with the local
community or culture, or when the birth parents are not really out of the picture
because they have not completely abandoned their interest in the child and thus
maintain contact with the child, but remain unable to provide care. In this case,
however, the child is an unlikely candidate for intercountry adoption.
	In sum, it is understandable that sending nations might prefer to satisfy an actual
demand for local placement, particularly local adoptive placement, over intercountry
placement. It is much less clear whether sending nations should grant a preference
for foster care, except to maintain a real, continuing relationship with the birth
family, or to maintain an older child’s real attachment to a language and culture. In
any event, the continuing availability of intercountry adoption need not stand in the
way of the goal of local placement. When a child needs family placement, either local
adoptive parents are immediately available or they are not. A rule that requires that
the child must be placed on hold for any significant length of time while authorities
continue to search for potential local adoptive parents harms the child without
fulfilling any current and genuine local parental demand. If intercountry adoption
really does divert placements to foreigners because of greater financial rewards to
intermediaries, the solution is to strengthen the enforcement of the rights of local
aspiring adoptive parents.
D. Moderate Critics of Intercountry Adoption
		

1. Overview

Between the supporters and cynical critics of intercountry adoption are the
moderate critics. Moderate critics do not oppose intercountry adoption in principle,
135. See Triseliotis & Hill, supra note 133, at 111–15.
136. See infra note 179; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics,

13 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law 181, 202, 206 (1996).
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but they worry that intercountry adoption is tainted by some amount of illegal and
unethical conduct, much more so in some sending nations than in others. In
comparison with vigorous supporters of intercountry adoption, moderate critics are
more likely to err in favor of more stringent regulation or moratoria to prevent illegal
or unethical practices, even if this means suspending or severely curtailing the
opportunity for perfectly legal adoptions. Professor Smolin, for example, has
catalogued and described a number of illegal or unethical practices that have actually
occurred on some scale, that taint the adoption process, and that lead to real harm to
children who are adopted.137 He and a number of other writers, including Johanna
Oreskovic, Trish Maskew, and Professor Marianne Blair, have also proposed a
number of needed reforms.138
The illegal or unethical practices moderate critics cite can be divided roughly
into two types. First, intermediaries sometimes use financial inducements to obtain
a birth mother’s relinquishment for adoption.139 The relinquishment might still be
“voluntary” in some sense.140 Perhaps if the birth parent had not relinquished the
child for adoption in return for money she would have relinquished the child for no
money at all, left the child in an institution, or delivered the child to real traffickers.
She might have viewed the acceptance of money in return for a relinquishment for
adoption as the best option for her and her child. Voluntary or not, a financial
inducement makes the relinquishment invalid under U.S. law and possibly criminal
under local or U.S. law, depending on the circumstances.141 Prohibiting financial
inducement in all cases is probably the best policy because an occasional practice of
financial inducement can grow into something much worse: a true market for
children in which there is real value in securing, collecting, and distributing children
for adoption. The intermediaries in such situations may regard the children they
trade as little more than livestock.142 A practice of financial inducement may also
affect personal relations between the parties in some disturbing ways, and it could be
severely disturbing to the child if he or she later understands that he or she was
“bought.”
137. See Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 49, at 125–26.
138. See id. at 171–86; Johanna Oreskovic & Trish Maskew, Red Thread Or Slender Reed: Deconstructing Prof.

Bartholet’s Mythology of International Adoption, 14 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 71, 121–27 (2008); see also,
e.g., Blair, supra note 115.

139. Blair, supra note 115, at 356–64, 366–67 (describing alleged financial inducements to women to

relinquish their children in Cambodia and Guatemala); see also Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 49,
at 161; Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 138, at 115.

140. There is a legitimate debate whether the “purchase” of the right to adopt a child should be illegal. E.g.,

Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323
(1978). However, for purposes of this article I will assume that the sale of the right to adopt a child is
wrong.

141. Not all sending nations have enacted criminal laws against financial inducement. See Mezmur, From

Angelina (To Madonna), supra note 66, at 151–52.

142. See Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 49, at 154–55.
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The second general class of illegal or unethical practices involves a purposeful or
neglectful misrepresentation of a child’s status or availability for adoption. If a true
market for children for adoption or other purposes has evolved in a community, an
intermediary might actually kidnap a child or obtain the child by making various
misrepresentations or false pretenses to the birth family. For example, an intermediary
might mislead birth parents by saying that he will arrange for the child’s temporary
shelter, care, and schooling in an orphanage.143 In order to place or distribute the child
for adoption—probably for a fee—this intermediary must create a false record and a
new identity for the child. The child’s real status and identity are “laundered.” A
variation of this problem occurs by neglect or mistake. A birth parent in economic or
other distress might leave her child with an orphanage for temporary care until the
child is older or the birth parent has overcome some problem and is able to care for the
child. A variety of mistakes—or opportunistic behavior by the orphanage if money is
involved—may lead to this child’s placement for adoption as an “abandoned” child.144
	As in the case of financial inducements, not all cases of “laundering” are equally
bad. It is reported that in Ecuador, corruption exists among public officials in
multiple layers of bureaucracy who stall adoptions in order to collect bribes, essentially
holding children hostage and playing on the emotions of adoptive parents who are
psychologically connected with the children assigned to them.145 According to these
reports, intermediaries sometimes manufacture paperwork to circumvent corrupt
officials and expedite the release of children who might truly be available for
adoption.146 The creation of forged documents might also be a way of cutting corners
for an otherwise well-intended adoption. UNICEF estimates that each year more
than fifty million children are not registered at birth.147 The complications of
providing documentary evidence of the status for such children might lead some
intermediaries to circumvent regulations requiring documents.
The fact that corruption, financial inducement, and the misrepresentation of
status occur is undeniable, and some of this malfeasance causes actual harm to
children, birth families, and adoptive families. The question is whether reform can
effectively deal with these problems without strangling intercountry adoption. The
answer to this question depends on the degree to which corruption problems are either
inherent and systemic in adoption per se or in the existing process for adoption.
	If adoption by its very nature leads unavoidably to an intolerable degree of
corruption, then reform would be hopeless. Fortunately, there are good reasons to
believe the problem of corruption is not that bad. Some sending nations such as
143. Blair, supra note 115, at 365–66 (describing scandals in India involving the alleged misrepresentation

made to parents that their children would be cared for in orphanages, coercion, and fraudulent creation
of new identity documents for children to be released for adoption).

144. See, e.g., Fonseca, supra note 4, at 172 (describing this problem in Brazil).
145. See Leifsen, supra note 50, at 190–92.
146. Id. at 187–92.
147. UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 24 (2009), available at http://www.unicefusa.org/

news/publications/state-of-the-worlds-children/SOWC_2010.pdf.
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Korea seem to have successfully avoided the corruption that has afflicted Cambodia
and parts of India. This difference suggests that “trafficking” or “laundering” are not
inherent features of adoption, and that these problems might depend mainly on local
conditions. Moreover, critics who have undertaken a careful study of actual cases, the
conditions under which they occurred, and the law and procedure as they exist appear
to be in wide agreement that reform is possible—or at least worth the effort.
		

2. Proposed Reforms

With regard to specific reforms, little could be added to what other writers have
already identified as measures that might greatly reduce the potential for illegal and
unethical practices.148 There are two sides to the reform equation: (1) changing the
law and procedure in sending nations to assure the existence of laws and competent
authorities to investigate and verify a child’s status and the legitimacy of the
relinquishment, and (2) changing the law in the United States and other receiving
nations to provide a second opportunity for verification, especially where the sending
nation’s investigation and verification is suspect.
	Naturally, there are limits to what the United States can do to impose reform on
other nations. The simplest and most direct route is to promote ratification and
implementation of the Hague Convention in nations that are not yet signatories. The
Convention requires the implementation of laws and procedures and the creation of
central authorities, which, if sufficiently and competently staffed and funded, can be
a safeguard against corrupt practices.149 Unfortunately, many sending nations have
not ratified the Convention, in some cases because they lack resources to implement
the Convention, and perhaps in others because they lack interest in promoting
intercountry adoption. To make the problem worse for non-Convention nations,
some of the best safeguards of U.S. immigration law apply only to adoptions from
sending nations that are parties to the Convention.150 In other words, U.S. regulation
is weakest where it might be needed the most. The United States should apply the
same or similar safeguards to adoptions from all nations, not just those that have
ratified the Convention. In the view of some critics, even the U.S. regulations for
Convention adoptions are not strong enough.151 For example, the United States could
strengthen its own rules for licensing and review of U.S. adoption agencies and for
scrutiny of adoption fees and costs.152
	Strengthening U.S. regulations alone cannot compensate for all shortcomings in
law and enforcement in sending nations, especially with respect to non-Convention
nations. For nations unwilling or unready to ratify the Convention, the United States
148. See Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 138, at 95–109; Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 49, at 174–

200.

149. Hague Convention, supra note 10, arts. 4, 6–11, 16, 22; see also Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 49,

at 174–200.

150. See Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 49, at 173–74.
151. See, e.g., Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 138, at 95–109.
152. Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 49, at 176–87.
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could seek bilateral agreements to establish procedures and safeguards under an
alternative set of rules.153 For non-Convention nations unwilling or unable to enter
into bilateral agreements, U.S. authorities must bear more than the usual responsibility
for investigation and verification, especially when there are special reasons to believe
that local protections against corruption are inadequate.
		

3. The Limits of Reform

Many of the proposed reforms will likely increase the cost of intercountry
adoption. Regrettably, the cost of intercountry adoption already exceeds the reach of
most of the middle class. Higher costs may be the unavoidable price of assuring the
legitimacy and reputation of intercountry adoption. However, a major goal for reform
must be regulation that does not needlessly increase costs. Some reforms might reduce
the cost of adoption to the extent they eliminate the misfeasance and malfeasance
that tend to drive costs higher, but most regulation does increase the cost of any
regulated activity. Reformers should remain conscious of this problem as they search
for the right balance between protective regulation and freedom of private initiative.
New regulations should target the greatest need. For example, it appears that patterns
of corruption sprout mainly in non-Convention nations. If so, raising regulatory
costs and barriers for adoptions under the Convention might be unnecessary. Overregulation of Convention adoptions might also be counterproductive if it drives more
adoptions to nations outside the Convention, particularly those where local law and
enforcement are weakest. Reformers should also concentrate on small measures that
have the potential for large impact, such as the use of DNA testing to discourage
some types of corruption.154
Reform must also be tempered with clear-eyed realism about what we can expect
to accomplish. Corruption in foreign nations will sometimes be beyond our control
or detection. There are limits to our ability to pressure other nations, especially very
poor nations, to improve their laws or enforcement. Measures that succeed for one
nation or one set of conditions might fail in other nations or under another set of
conditions. It appears that some reform efforts overseas have actually backfired
because the bureaucracies created to combat corruption became corrupt themselves.155
Moreover, the United States is not the only receiving nation. The measures the
153. See, e.g., Agreement Regarding Cooperation of the Adoption of Children, U.S.-Viet., June 21, 2005,

State Dep’t No. 06-10, 2005 WL 3826041; see also Lindsay K. Carlberg, Note, The Agreement Between
the United States and Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children: A More Effective and
Efficient Solution to the Implementation of The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption Or Just Another
Road to Nowhere Paved With Good Intentions?, 17 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 119, 124 (2007) (discussing
some drawbacks of the bilateral treaty approach).

154. For example, the United States now requires DNA testing as a condition of adoptions out of Guatemala.

McKinney, supra note 15, at 404–05; Katherine Sohr, Comment, Difficulties Implementing the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: A Criticism of
the Proposed Ortega’s Law and an Advocacy for Moderate Adoption Reform in Guatemala, 18 Pace Int’l L.
Rev. 559, 566 (2006).

155. Blair, supra note 115, at 392–93 (describing the situation in India).
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United States adopts might not be embraced by other receiving nations. U.S.
safeguards might then be undermined by persistent abuses by intermediaries who
serve mainly adoptive parents from other nations.156 Finally, no amount of regulation
or investigation is a guarantee that there will be no corruption. Unfortunately, a
single corrupt agency or intermediary can cause enormous damage to persons involved
in adoption and to the popular image of intercountry adoption. In Cambodia, for
example, it appears that a very large part of that nation’s adoption scandals occurred
under the direction of a single individual.157
What if it becomes clear that our efforts to guard against unethical or illegal
practices have not completely succeeded? In some cases, the United States has taken
the extreme measure: a moratorium against approval of adoption of children from
nations where there are particularly grave concerns about adoption. Such a moratorium
is now in effect for Nepal.158 Moratoria is a measure of last resort because they block
both legitimate and illegitimate adoptions under the assumption that U.S. authorities
are no longer able to distinguish one from the other. They bar even adoptions
between parties who found each other by means other than the suspect agencies or
processes that led to the moratorium.159 When corruption is isolated or traceable to
particular agencies or persons, the question then becomes whether we should allow
intercountry adoption to continue, or whether we should avoid the risk of even a
single illegitimate relinquishment.
	In answering this question, we should remember that U.S. adoption law has
survived and progressed despite many adoption scandals. In the very earliest days of
adoption before modern regulation, some unknown number of children were placed
by notorious “baby farms” that purchased infants born to prostitutes or unwed
mothers.160 Somewhat more recently, the domestic adoption scene was rocked by the
Tennessee Children’s Home scandal. Between 1924 and 1950, Georgia Tann
managed an adoption service that placed thousands of children, including children
adopted by Hollywood stars Joan Crawford, June Allyson, and Dick Powell.161 Tann’s
methods were as depraved as those of any of the foreign intermediaries involved in
modern-day scandals overseas. Her tactics included deceiving young mothers into
156. See, e.g., Leifsen, supra note 50, at 187–88 (describing aspects of Spanish law that may tend to increase

the likelihood of corruption in Ecuador).

157. Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 138, at 114–16.
158. Important Information Regarding Adoptions from Nepal, Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t of

State, http://adoption.state.gov/news/nepalalerts.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).

159. We should remember that whatever model we imagine as describing “intercountry adoption,” there are

an infinite variety of circumstances in which members of the adoption triad come together. See, e.g.,
Godula Kosack, Adopting a Native Child: An Anthropologist’s Personal Involvement in the Field, in CrossCultural Approaches to Adoption, supra note 4, at 21.

160. See Ellen Herman, Baby Farming, The Adoption History Project, http://www.uoregon.

edu/~adoption/topics/babyfarming.html (last updated July 11, 2007).

161. See Fredric Koeppel, Author Spent 16 Years Delving into the Power Georgia Tann Wielded and the Victims

She Left, Memphis Comm. Appeal (Sept. 25, 2007, 12:03 AM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/
news/2007/sep/25/the-baby-thief/.
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believing that their infants had died in the hospital, when in fact they had been
placed for adoption or sold to other agencies.162
The scandals that have occurred within the United States are instructive in this
way: there were no moratoria. Instead, state legislatures, courts, and child welfare
authorities continued the process of reform that has never really ended. To be sure,
corrupt practitioners caused real damage to an untold number of birth families,
adoptees, and adopters. Adoption still occurs in the United States, however, because
it is the best option for a much larger number of people. Moreover, not every birth
parent, child, or adoptive parent snared by a corrupted adoption was worse off for it.
For some birth mothers, the only real option was adoption, perfectly legitimate or
otherwise. For some adoptive children, the trauma of learning some secret and
possibly dark side to the dissolution and reformation of their family is not as harmful
as what they might have suffered if they remained with birth parents unable to
provide care. The practice of adoption persists in the United States because the good
that adoption offers for all the parties exceeds the risks of Georgia Tann, although
we should never stop worrying about Georgia Tann.
III. ARE THERE ORPHANS?

The argument that intercountry adoption offers benefits for all the parties—
especially children—depends on a premise: there are children who are available for,
and in need of, adoption. Surprisingly, a debate has emerged about whether there are
significant numbers of “orphans”163 in the world. Some cynical critics have asserted
that the existence of orphans is a myth,164 although they may have meant only that
the existence of extremely large numbers of orphans is a myth. However, even some
moderate critics now claim that there is some aspect of “mythology” about orphans
in the argument for promoting intercountry adoption.165 If these attacks were only
against the advertising of child welfare agencies soliciting monetary donations or
applications for adoption, they might have some degree of merit. However, the
mythology argument has been leveled directly at the academic debate as whether
there is a role for adoption as a solution for some children in need.
	At first glance, the argument seems mainly one of splitting hairs about how
many millions of “orphans” there are in the world. Professor Bartholet has said that
there are “millions on millions” of “[homeless] children.”166 Johanna Oreskovic and
Trish Maskew have taken issue with Professor Bartholet’s statement.167 They note
162. Id.
163. The term “orphan” can be misleading in the context of the intercountry adoption debate. Strictly speaking,

an “orphan” is a child “deprived by death of one or usually both parents.” Orphan Definition, MerriamWebster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/orphan (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).

164. See Bowie, supra note 4, at 14; Fonseca, supra note 4, at 165.
165. See Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 138, at 74.
166. Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 158.
167. See Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 138, at 79.
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that UNICEF statistics show that only 2.6 million children are housed in
institutions.168 Perhaps 2.6 million (counting only institutionalized, and not street,
children) is not yet “millions on millions,”169 but the rebuttal misses the point. As
Professor Bartholet emphasized, presently there are not enough adoptions of any sort
to serve more than a tiny fraction of these children.170 If the greatest number of
intercountry adoptions in any one year has been something less than 50,000, it is
likely to be a very small fraction indeed.
The important fact is that the number of children who might be well served by
the opportunity for adoption greatly exceeds the number of adoptions that are being
processed. This is true even if most of the millions of children not being raised in
families are, in fact, not adoptable because they still have an attachment to their birth
families, or because they have become so old or of such poor mental, emotional, or
physical health that most prospective adopters are unwilling or unable to bear the
special challenges and sacrifices of raising them in their homes. Even if Professor
Bartholet has overestimated the number, even if there are only two or three million
and not “millions on millions,” and even if only one in twenty of these children is
“adoptable,” there are still more adoptable children than there are likely to be
prospective adoptive parents under present conditions.
	In truth, Professor Bartholet’s estimate of the “millions on millions” of children in
distress who might benefit from adoption is much closer to the truth than Oreskovic’s
and Maskew’s rebuttal. UNICEF—an agency not known for promoting intercountry
adoption171—estimates that about 145 million children around the world have lost one
or both parents.172 An earlier UNICEF survey of a limited number of nations showed
that there were nearly 10 million “double orphans” who had certainly lost both parents.173
UNICEF does not collect such statistics to support any argument in favor of intercountry
adoption. UNICEF is at best neutral and frequently discourages intercountry
adoption.174 However, the “orphan” statistics are important to UNICEF because they
suggest the magnitude of an unknowable number of children who are at risk of the loss
of an effective family environment because of the death of parents.175 Of course,
children counted as “orphans” by their local governments are only half the story.
168. See id. at 78.
169. Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 158.
170. Id. at 164.
171. In its latest report, for example, UNICEF refers to a child’s right not to be illegally adopted and says

nothing of a right to an opportunity for lawful adoption. UNICEF, The State of the World’s
Children, supra note 147, at 25.

172. Id.
173. UNICEF et al., Children on the Brink 2002: A Joint Report on Orphan Estimates &

Program Strategies 7 (2002), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACP860.pdf.

174. UNICEF’s report lists many projects and measures to better the situation of children around the world.

It does not include adoption—domestic or intercountry—among these initiatives. UNICEF, The State
of the World’s Children, supra note 147, at 24.

175. UNICEF, Children on the Brink, supra note 173, at 9.
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Another large number of children are placed by living parents in precarious situations,
including institutions, which house about 2.6 million children.176 Those who end up in
institutions are not necessarily the least lucky. UNICEF estimates that 150 million
children as young as five years old are engaged in child labor.177 In Haiti alone, it is
estimated that 173,000 children are trafficked for domestic servitude.178 In Sri Lanka
alone, estimates of the number of children employed as prostitutes or sold into the sex
trade range upward to 100,000.179 To say that most of these children were not “orphans,”
or that many have missed their chance for adoption because they are now too old for
adoption, misses the point. Many of these children might have enjoyed a better situation
if adoption had been an alternative.
The disparity between the numbers of children in distress and the number of
intercountry adoptions is startling. Intercountry adoption is extraordinarily expensive
and difficult, but given the number of children potentially well served by adoption, it
should not be. Why have the costs of intercountry adoption risen so much that only
the wealthy and the more affluent members of the middle class can afford it? Why
has the effort to adopt become so difficult, including, for example, international
travel and lengthy stays of weeks or months in foreign countries? The answer might
be that there are severe impediments to matching children in need with parents
willing and desiring to accept parenthood by adoption. The current system does a
poor job of linking potential adoptive parents to real needs. A paradox has emerged:
there are many, many children who might benefit from adoption, but they are so
scarce that adoption agencies can charge high fees, orphanages can demand large
donations, and national governments can impose procedural requirements that
contribute mainly to the local tourist economy rather than to child welfare.
	In a perverse way, there may be a point at which the fear of corruption and
overzealous and misplaced regulatory response breeds even more corruption. Already,
adoptive parents might be taking more and more risks in the frontiers of the
developing world and paying large sums of money for adoption because they have no
choice. As more nations prohibit intercountry adoption or raise costs and regulatory
hurdles, the cost of adoption soars upward, making it even more likely that there will
be corruption in an ever smaller number of nations that do permit intercountry
adoption. Moreover, if the reform measures we adopt raise the price of adoption even
higher, the stereotype of the wealthy Westerner “shopping” for children in poorly
developed, “exploited” nations might become self-fulfilling. Adoption will become
an exclusive reserve for the rich, and it will occur mainly in countries that lack the
ability to have any regulation at all.
176. See Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 138, at 79; Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra

note 21, at 183.

177. UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children, supra note 147, at 24.
178. IOM, Child Trafficking & Abuse in Haiti, supra note 132.
179. Sri Lanka—The Paradise for Paedophiles and Child Prostitution, LankaNewspapers.com, Dec. 18, 2008,

http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2008/12/36809_space.html.
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Regulatory reform is one half of the answer to illegal and unethical practices.
The other half is to make sure that children who could benefit from adoption are not
denied the opportunity.
IV.	Restating International Law for Intercountry Adoption: Seeking
the Better Interests of Children

A. From “Best” to “Better” Interests

	As noted earlier, the debate over intercountry adoption is framed in part by two
international documents, the CRC and the Hague Convention.180 Together, these
documents make important contributions to family law in general and adoption law
in particular. They are, however, only intermediate steps toward the development of
better laws for the protection of children and promotion of their interests. There are
three more steps that could improve the welfare of children by advancing the law of
adoption: (1) the substitution of a new international standard for evaluating child
welfare policies; (2) a more decisive endorsement of adoption, both domestic and
intercountry; and (3) a clearer statement of what subsidiarity requires in intercountry
adoption.
First, international law needs a better standard for evaluating national policies for
the protection of children. The CRC states what is widely known as the “best
interests” standard: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”181
The “best interests” standard, or at least the phrase, appears to have its origins in
U.S. and British family law.182 To American and British lawyers trained in family
law, the term “best interests” is greatly restricted by implicit limits and by
acknowledged uncertainty about what “children” we are protecting and what we
mean by “best.”
	Despite what the best interests standard might seem to suggest, no court in
America upholds the interests of any child without at least some regard for the
interests of other parties, including parents most of all.183 If children’s interests were
all that counted, the state would have authority to intervene and transfer custody of a
child—and possibly place the child for adoption—whenever it found that birth
parents were not as capable as other potential parents or caregivers. In part, this is
because courts “presume” that a parent acts in the best interests of his or her child
even if a judge or jury might reasonably disagree with a parent’s decisions regarding
180. See supra Part I.A.
181. CRC, supra note 9, art. 3, sec. 1.
182. See generally Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in

American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. & Fam. Stud. 337 (2008) (discussing the background and foundation of
the best interests standard in British and U.S. common law).

183. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of a parent’s

unfitness as basis for termination of parental rights).
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the child.184 It is only when a court must resolve a dispute between two parents—as
in a custody dispute in a divorce or when something extraordinary happens such as
the parent’s serious abuse or neglect of the child—that a court reaches a question
about the child’s best interests.185 Moreover, the best interests standard is essentially
an adjudicatory rule for resolving a dispute between two parties over a single child.
There is no law in the United States that requires that legislatures or other law or
policymaking bodies always place the child’s interests ahead of the interests of parents
or other parties. Laws that grant parents wide discretion in managing a child’s
education, religious instruction, and medical treatment or that restrict the grounds
for state intervention in the family tip the scales in favor of parental interests.
	Despite what the CRC says in its Preamble, even the CRC grants that a child’s
interests do not prevail over a parent’s interests in all situations—especially when it
comes to adoption. Article 21 provides that if a nation permits adoption (and it is not
required to do so), living parents or even other members of the extended family
might have the right to veto the child’s adoption, regardless of whether local
authorities might find that adoption would be in the child’s best interests.186 Of
course, proponents of group solidarity would also argue that national, community, or
other group interests should trump the interests of the child.
The best interests standard can also be unhelpful, particularly in international
law, because it is so vague about the “child” or the “children” we have in mind. The
“child” might be a particular child before a tribunal making a decision about that
child, or the “child” might represent the class of children or some subclass of children.
Article 3 of the CRC highlights this uncertainty by stating that “in all actions
concerning children . . . the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”187
The question of whether we should focus exclusively on the interest of the child in
any proceeding versus the interests of children as a class is commonplace in U.S
family law cases. This is because the courts or policy makers frequently act based on
generalization rather than individuation. Legal proceedings are rarely if ever capable
of an exhaustive and definitive determination of the interests of a particular child.
Decision makers must rely on generalizations or value judgments they assume work
for most children in the usual run of cases. Thus, decisions follow rules or
presumptions that are usually in the best interests of children even though they are
bound to fail many individual children.
For example, a judge might believe that a relative is a better caregiver for a child
than a non-relative because the relative will love the child more and will also be
bound by “family duty” to bear the responsibility of caring for the child. In some
cases—perhaps in a great many—this generalization is unfair to particular parties,
184. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (finding that a court must presume mother is acting for

child’s best interests in limiting contact with paternal grandparents).

185. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that it is unconstitutional for a state to terminate

the parental rights of an unmarried father without proof of his abuse or neglect of his children).

186. See CRC, supra note 9, art. 21.
187. Id. art. 3 (emphasis added).

773

Seeking the Better Interests of Children

but the truth might not be discoverable in any reasonably efficient fact-finding
procedure. A similar issue of generalizations is at work in intercountry adoption. The
CRC presently describes the importance of preserving a child’s heritage in a family
placement decision.188 As noted earlier, for older children the generalization might be
reasonably valid as a way of doing what is best for the child. However, blind adherence
to this generalization will deny many individual children their better chances in
intercountry adoption.
	One could also say that the best interests of an individual child are sometimes
disregarded in order to protect the best interests of children as a class. Thus, we resist
the urge to intervene in families that are merely less than satisfactory because
government intervention on such a scale would breed uncertainty and insecurity that
would be unhealthy for families and their children in general. In the debate over
intercountry adoption, some opponents of adoption make a similar argument: that
intercountry adoption may be good for the child who is adopted, but the availability
of adoption undermines the interests of the children who are left behind.189
Finally, the best interests standard is misleading to the extent it suggests that the
law will achieve an ideal outcome. When American or British lawyers invoke the
best interests standard, they understand that the “best” is not really attainable. A
court, child placement authority, or other decision maker normally has a limited set
of choices before it at the time it makes its decision for the child. In a child custody
decision, for example, there are only two parents, or one parent and one or more nonparents, from which to choose. The decision maker cannot search beyond this small
circle of persons in search of the “best.”
	It might seem that adoptive placement offers a decision maker a greater range of
decisions, and that he or she really can seek the “best” of all placements for a child,
but in this regard the best interests standard is misleading and potentially harmful.
An authority making a placement decision might be tempted to wait for “still better”
or the “very best.” If an adoptive family that is ready now to adopt appears imperfect
because they are of a different culture, race, or nationality, because they are
fundamental Baptists instead of Unitarians, or because they are aff luent and
materialistic instead of socially conscious and spiritual, the decision maker might be
tempted to wait. To a limited extent, “waiting” can be an option in adoptive placement.
It is possible that the next set of applicants will be a better match or better parents in
the authority’s view. Nevertheless, waiting can cause real harm to children if they
remain too long in institutions or substandard foster care and lose their opportunity
for early family bonding. After a point, they will simply become one more of the
millions on millions who are too old for adoption.
The best interests standard is a puzzle, but probably a harmless one for American
lawyers who understand its limits and who know the issues that lurk beneath the
phrase. On the international stage, however, the “best interests” standard has extra
potential for misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and misdirection. For one thing,
188. See supra Part II.C.2.
189. See supra Part II.C.5.
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it seems to lead some critics to believe that adoption should not go forward unless
there is proof that it will result in the “best” for every child. Of course, no child
welfare policy can make this guarantee. The broad policies we enact can only better
the odds for children. Laws that make adoption possible and that preserve the
opportunity for adoption better the odds for children even if they cannot guarantee
the same result for each child, and even if the result is not the “best” that could be
imagined for every child. Some adoptions will fail, and some will even be corrupt.
But not permitting adoption can also be harmful to children who lose the opportunity
to escape a desperate situation. The odds for children left in institutions are certainly
much, much worse than the odds for children released for adoption.
For purposes of international law, the best interests standard should be retired as
a basis for drafting broad child welfare policies. It should be replaced by a statement
that we should promote laws and policies that will achieve “better” outcomes for
children in general. Among the policies that achieve better outcomes for children as
a class are policies that preserve the opportunity for adoption. International law
should also clarify that, in making individual placement decisions, time is an
important factor. At some point, authorities making the decision must accept that
immediate family placement is the better option.
B. Endorsement of Adoption or Equivalent Forms of Parenthood

The CRC takes only a half-step toward recognizing the importance of a family
environment for children. It states in the Preamble that “the child, for the full and
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.”190 But what if
the family is unable to care for the child for any reason? Article 20 provides that if a
child is “deprived of his or her family environment,” the state’s obligation is to “ensure
alternative care.”191 The CRC does not define or limit “alternative care.” It provides
only examples: “Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah of Islamic
law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of
children.”192 Article 20, by its terms, does not exhaust the possibilities of what a state
might deem to qualify as “alternative care.” If adoptive or foster care (or kafalah in
Muslim communities) is unavailable because of a shortage of parental applicants or
funds to pay for foster care, institutional care will likely be “necessary.” The fact that
millions of children remain in institutions may be unfortunate, but it is completely
consistent with what the CRC deems to be in the best interests of children. A nation
can choose to store its children in institutions without encouraging or even allowing
adoption.
Remarkably, the CRC creates no obligation for a state even to authorize adoption.
It is important to emphasize that this is not just a failure to promote intercountry
190. CRC, supra note 9, at pmbl.
191. Id. art. 20.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
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adoption. It is a failure to promote any kind of adoption, including adoption by
parents of the same nation or community. The CRC’s acquiescence in child welfare
policy that rejects adoption is verified by Article 21.193 The purpose of Article 21 is
to protect children from certain illicit or unethical practices of adoption. In restricting
adoption, the drafters of Article 21 were careful to indicate that the CRC does not
require that children must have any opportunity for adoption. The rules it provides
apply only to states that have decided, without obligation, to permit children to be
adopted.
Major international organizations have validated the CRC’s rejection of adoption
as an essential part of local child welfare policy. UNICEF’s position on adoption
could be described as neutral at best.194 It has consistently missed one opportunity
after another to include adoption law as the kind of local reform nations should
undertake to improve the care and welfare of children in need. UNICEF’s
recommendations for child-welfare policies consistently call for vigilance against
illicit adoption or “trafficking,” but fail to encourage legitimate adoption as any part
of child welfare policy.195
The failure to require all nations to authorize adoption and promote adoptive
placement for children in need is a major and inexcusable shortcoming in the CRC
given our current knowledge of child development. There may be a considerable
range of opinions regarding when and under what circumstances children should be
placed for adoption. However, the United Nations should take at least the first
essential step of recognizing that adoption in some form is an essential part of child
welfare policy.
The promotion of adoption necessarily invites the question: Under what
circumstances should the law provide for a child’s adoption? The issue is particularly
important with respect to children who are in orphanages but not relinquished for
adoption by living parents. Some critics of intercountry adoption appear to argue
that children in institutions do not count as available for adoption if a parent is alive.
They note that impoverished parents often place their children in institutions because
they are unable to care for them. These children remain attached to their parents in
193. See id. art. 21.
194. See Dillon, supra note 22, at 198 & n.58.
195. UNICEF’s many missed opportunities to include adoption as a part of a recommended child-welfare

policy include: Inter-Parliamentary Union & UNICEF, Combating Child Trafficking 13–17,
39 (2005), available at http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/IPU_combattingchildtrafficking_GB.
pdf; UNICEF et al., Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe 82 & n.128
(2004), available at http://www.unicef.org/media/files/2004Focus_on_Prevention_in_SEE.pdf;
UNICEF, 1 Handbook on Legislative Reform: Realising Children’s Rights 170 (2008),
available at http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Handbook_on_Legislative_Reform.pdf; UNICEF,
Supporting the Realization of Children’s Rights Through a Rights-Based Approach to
Legislative Reform 58, 111–12 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.unicef.org/Supporting_the_
Realization_of_Childrens_Rights_Through_a_Rights_Based_Approach_To_Legislative_Reform.
pdf; Vanessa Sedletzki, UNICEF, Legislative Reform for the Protection of the Rights of
Child Victims of Trafficking 1, 39 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.unicef.org/policyanalysis/
files/Legislative_Reform_for_the_Protection_of_the_Rights_of_Child_Victims_of_Trafficking.pdf.
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some way. The parents’ dilemma is a cruel one, just as it is for some parents who opt
to place their children for adoption. As noted earlier, the parents do have some rights
in the matter of the child’s disposition. Even in the United States, there are legal
safeguards against an involuntary termination of parental rights for the purpose of
adoption. However, institutionalization of children—particularly infants and very
young children—may be so destructive to a child’s health and development that the
child’s need for family placement supersedes the parents’ interests.196 The fact that
this issue is difficult and complex should not deter the United Nations or UNICEF
from beginning to lead the world toward a resolution of the issue as a matter of basic
human rights.
	A separate question is whether the United Nations or other international
organizations should recognize a duty for every nation to authorize intercountry
adoption. Local political considerations aside, every nation should authorize
intercountry adoption and participate in international efforts to safeguard against
abuse, at least to the extent that local family placement is not possible. A more
complete answer to this question involves a look at the idea of subsidiarity.
C. Clarification of Subsidiarity

	Subsidiarity is a principle recognized in the CRC and the Hague Convention
that authorizes, and arguably requires, a nation to pursue local placement ahead of
intercountry adoption.197 The question of whether and how the principle of
subsidiarity should be described by international law requires an exploration of rules
that might better the odds for children in need, but the answer is ultimately limited
by politics in sending nations. It is one thing to urge nations to authorize and promote
adoption by their own citizens. It is another to require them to permit foreigners to
adopt children.
	Local politics aside, intercountry adoption should be part of any nation’s child
welfare policy, as it is in the United States, both as a receiving and sending nation.198
Intercountry adoption serves two important roles for child welfare policy. First, for a
child for whom local family placement is not available, intercountry adoption offers
an alternative to institutionalization or substandard foster care, and the opportunity
for intercountry adoption should be regarded as the child’s right. The United Nations
should join the Hague Convention in forthrightly recognizing that institutionalization
is never the better option for very young children, and might not be in the interest of
some older children. The United Nations should also address the troubling question
of what constitutes appropriate foster care. Considering the wide range of what might
196. For a discussion of U.S. law on this issue, see Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 359–60.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 11–20. UNICEF is one international organization that appears to

interpret the CRC to require that local law should allow intercountry adoption only as a last resort. See,
e.g., supra notes 147, 173, 195 and accompanying text.

198. See 42 U.S.C. § 14901 (2006) (describing the purpose of the law as to “improve the ability of the Federal

Government to assist United States citizens seeking to adopt children from abroad and residents of other
countries party to the Convention seeking to adopt children from the United States”) (emphasis added).
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constitute such care, it is unacceptable to grant a blank license for whatever a nation
might deem to be foster care.
	Second, intercountry adoption can be a catalyst for domestic adoption.
Intercountry adoption creates a demand for the establishment of local institutions
and laws for adoption. Foreigners demonstrate the example of adoption as an
acceptable means of family building. Local authorities who deplore intercountry
adoption are incentivized to resist by creating a real alternative: domestic adoption.
But international law should discourage hard national preferences and should demand
early family placement by any means, including intercountry adoption, so that
children do not wait in institutions to the point of physical and emotional harm
while authorities search for local parents.199
V. CONCLUSION

Three different groups—cynical critics, moderate critics, and vigorous
advocates—are struggling over the future of intercountry adoption. Vigorous
advocates seek to promote a larger role for intercountry adoption in international
child welfare policy. On the other side of the debate, the most extreme cynical critics
would ban intercountry adoption, while less extreme cynical critics would be content
to discourage adoption or allow its decline into insignificance. Moderate critics
forming a third group seek to reform intercountry adoption to prevent abuses.
The best approach lies somewhere between the positions of vigorous advocates
and moderate critics. The cynical arguments against intercountry adoption are based
on agendas distinctly different from the best interests of children, or on erroneous
assumptions about the harms of intercountry adoption. Adoption scandals are very
real and they do cause harm to some number of parents and children, but a complete
ban on or end to intercountry adoption would harm a much greater number of
children who would be abandoned to institutionalized care, or worse.
The answer is careful regulation, not prohibition. Indeed, regulation designed to
prevent real abuse is as necessary in the intercountry arena as it is in domestic
adoption, but too much regulation can backfire. Overregulation will strand thousands
of children in institutions, raise costs beyond the reach of many prospective adopters,
and drive other prospective adopters into nations where costs are low and adoptions
are “possible” but legal protection for any of the parties is weak. The “right” level of
regulation will be no guarantee that every child’s adoptive placement will be perfect,
ideal, or even lawful. Adoption is no more capable of perfection than any other
worthy child welfare policy. However, the benefits that adoption offers, and the
many children who would almost certainly benefit by adoption, make it a policy that
deserves our efforts.
To promote a balanced approach to intercountry adoption, reform is required not
only in local and national law, but also in international law. This article has proposed
199. See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 21, at 361–62 (describing the tendency of sending nations to

require lengthy and potentially harmful holding periods to enforce preferences for local adoptive
parents); see also Bartholet, Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, supra note 21, at 193–95.
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three particular reforms for international law. First, the “best interests” standard
borrowed from British and American family law should be abandoned in international
law in favor of a standard or set of standards that translates more meaningfully as a
goal of child welfare policy and as an accommodation of various family interests.
Second, international law should decisively endorse adoptive family placement—
domestic or otherwise—as a solution for children who will otherwise likely be
without emotional and material family support. In other words, international law
should make it clear that long-term institutionalization or other placements that fail
to build a true “family” are generally not the best option for children. Third,
international law should address the role of intercountry placement within a policy of
favoring adoption, to state clearly that sending nations may prefer their own local
adoptive family placements, but that intercountry adoption will often be the next
best alternative.
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